New serious inter-ethnic conflicts are brewing in Europe as it battles the global economic crisis. Typically they are deeply rooted in history, but the very fact that the renaissance of ethnic separatism in Europe is taking place in the epoch of European integration is noteworthy. Obviously, the enlargement of NATO and the EU neither brought stability to the continent nor precluded the recurrence of the phenomena commonplace in the XIX century but totally unexpected in the united Europe boasting a common currency. The truth to be faced is that the conflicts – unresolvable within the existing legal framework, especially given its condition after the notorious Kosovo case – undermine the cohesion of the EU.

Just recently, on August 3, the UN Security Council’s debates over Kosovo once again highlighted the divisions among great powers and the inability of the top international body to pass resolutions sending clear messages to the world. Now the UN finds itself confronted with an equally disturbing historical problem as three Hungarian associations linked to The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania submitted a report to the UN charging Bucharest with violations of ethnic Hungarians’ rights at all levels. The associations demand a special legal status in line with the European legislation – a de facto autonomy – for the regions of Romania compactly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. The report says 1,500,000 Hungarians in Romania have no intention to abandon their right to national identity and homeland. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has put the examination of the document on its agenda, and the opening of debates on a higher level, perhaps involving Austria, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Croatia, looms on the horizon.

According to the report, Hungarians in Romania are treated as second-grade citizens. Making up almost 80% of the population in some of the country’s regions, Hungarians are represented at the level of at most 20% in the corresponding local administrations. The report also carries charges of economic discrimination against the Hungarian-populated territories, stating that they remain underdeveloped compared to Romania’s other provinces and that their key natural resources such as salt and mineral water are under the control of the central administration.

The problem of the Hungarian minority in Romania is historical. It dates back to the collapse of Austria-Hungary whose defeat in World War I entailed an overhaul of European borders. As prescribed by the 1920 Trianon Treaty, Hungary’s territory was reduced by 72% and its population thus shrank by 64%, from 21 to under 8 million people. Roughly a third of Hungarians – 3.3 out of 10.7 million people – had to accept that the areas where they lived were no longer parts of Hungary. Since the time, over 1.5 million Hungarians inhabit Romania’s Transylvania – and periodically complain about the pressure exerted on them by the country’s administration. It could be partially attributed to the ethnic factor that in 1989 the uprising against Romania’s long-time communist leader N. Ceausesku began in Timisoara, Transylvania. The discontent currently expressed by Hungarian associations in Romania is a manifestation of quite traditional grievances.

As for South East Europe, its persisting sore is, of course, the Cyprus problem. Having joined the EU as an entirety, Cyprus nevertheless has the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on its territory. To complicate things further, TRNC is recognized by Turkey, which is a NATO country. The TRNC problem is not even inching towards any kind of a solution, and the triumph of Turkish nationalists advocating closer ties with Turkey during the recent elections in the northern part of Cyprus widened the gap between its Greek and Turkish communities.

This particular problem actually mirrors a broader trend. The allegations voiced by the Hungarian associations in Romania and their demands replicate the programs incessantly floated over the recent years by the leaders of Albanian communities in Macedonia, South Serbia, Montenegro and elsewhere. The Albanian leaders in the above regions, on their part, are following the lead of their Kosovo brethren. The domino effect triggered by separatism in Kosovo is unfolding and spreading beyond the confines of the Balkan region.

The current developments have a geopolitical dimension. Hungary and Romania are members of the EU and NATO, the two alliances which truly hate to see discord in their ranks. Yet, the discord is not limited to the case of Romania’s Hungarian community. Hungarians in Slovakia and Slovaks in Hungary are locked in similar disputes (which are also instances of the Trianon legacy). The Basque problem both destabilizes Spain and tells on its relations with France, which, by the way, also faces the problem of separatism in Corsica. In Italy, Lega Nord – the Northern League openly seeking self-determination for the country’s northern regions in the form of the Republic of Padania – is customarily represented in the Italian government. Belgium is left with a caretaker government due to the disagreements between Flanders and the Walloon Region. On top of all that, there is Northern Ireland and Scotland where separatists enjoy steady public support.

As for South East Europe, its persisting sore is, of course, the Cyprus problem. Having joined the EU as an entirety, Cyprus nevertheless has the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on its territory. To complicate things further, TRNC is recognized by Turkey, which is a NATO country. The TRNC problem is not even inching towards any kind of a solution, and the triumph of Turkish nationalists advocating closer ties with Turkey during the recent elections in the northern part of Cyprus widened the gap between its Greek and Turkish communities.

It is an accomplished fact that the enlargement of NATO and the EU failed to deliver on the promises of European stability and did not prevent the rise of ethnic separatism across Europe. On top of the practice of double standards which explicitly surfaced in the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion on the Kosovo independence, the renaissance of ethnic separatism in Europe stems from the lack of sizable benefits of the EU membership for many of the alliance’s members. Not only the global economic meltdown, but also the difficulties encountered in the process of adopting the European constitution, the Treaty of Lisbon, and other basic documents, the unchecked swelling of the Brussels bureaucracy, and the barely disguised discrimination against some of the EU members in Europe’s decision-making tend to depreciate the ideal of united Europe. As a result, some of the nations are disappointed in the European integration and increasingly turn to ethnically based statehood. That in itself could be a tolerable condition, but altogether the Great Albania, the Great Hungary, the Great Romania, etc. have no chance to fit into limited geographic space, while their potential conflicts are prone with new interethnic conflicts and religious wars.

Petr Iskenderov is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science and an international commentator at Vremya Novstey and the Voice of Russia.

SCF

Srdja Trifkovic: The ICJ has done more than its share of norm-creation. Its advisory opinion is deeply flawed and non-binding, but the government in Belgrade now has a perfect alibi for doing what it had intended to do all along.

Ever since the U.S. intervened in Serbia’s domestic politics two years ago and helped the current coalition take power in Belgrade, Boris Tadić and his cohorts have been looking for a way to capitulate on Kosovo while pretending not to. The formula was simple: place all diplomatic eggs in one basket – that of the International Court of Justice – and refrain from using any other political or economic (let alone military) tools at Serbia’s disposal. On July 22 the ICJ performed on cue, declaring that Kosovo’s UDI was not illegal.

It should be noted that the ICJ has only assessed Kosovo’s declaration of independence; it has not considered more widely Kosovo’s right to unilateral secession from Serbia. Furthermore, the ICJ has not assessed either the consequences of the adoption of the UDI, namely whether Kosovo is a state, or the legitimacy of its recognition by a number of countries. The ICJ decision was unsurprising in view of the self-defeating which the UN General Assembly posed at Serbia’s request: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?” As a former British diplomat who knows the Balkans well has noted, international law takes no notice of declarations of independence, unilateral or otherwise; they are irrelevant:

[I]f the town council down the road here in the UK makes a solemn unilateral declaration of the town’s independence from the UK, the rest of us will make a wry smile and go back to blogging or working. The declaration is ‘in accordance’ with UK law – free speech and all that. [ ... ] If citizens of our town en masse support the declaration of independence, put up road-blocks, stop paying taxes to Westminster and proclaim Vladimir Putin their new king with his consent, things begin to get more interesting. Norms are being created and broken in all directions.

The ICJ has done more than its share of norm-creation. Its advisory opinion is deeply flawed and non-binding, but the government in Belgrade now has a perfect alibi for doing what it had intended to do all along.

Following the appointment of Vuk Jeremić as Serbia’s foreign minister in 2007, this outcome could be predicted with near-certainty. As President Boris Tadić’s chief foreign policy advisor, Jeremić came to Washington on 18 May 2005 to testify in Congress on why Kosovo should stay within Serbia. In his subsequent off-the-record conversations, however, he assured his hosts that the task was really to sugar-coat the bitter Kosovo pill that Serbia would have to swallow anyway.

Two years later another advisor to Tadić, Dr. Leon Kojen, resigned in a blaze of publicity after Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer declared, on April 13, 2007, “We are working with Boris Tadić and his people to find a way to implement the essence of the Ahtisaari plan.” Tout Belgrade knew that “Tadić’s people” meant—Vuk Jeremić. Gusenbauer’s indiscretion amounted to the revelation that Serbia’s head of state and his closest advisor were engaged in secret negotiations aimed at facilitating the detachment of Kosovo from Serbia—which, of course, was “the essence of the Ahtisaari plan.” Jeremić’s quest for sugar-coating the bitter pill was evidently in full swing even before he came to the helm of Serbia’s diplomacy.

In the intervening three years Tadić and Jeremić have continued to pursue a dual-track policy on Kosovo. The decisive fruit of that policy was their disastrous decision to accept the European Union’s Eulex Mission in Kosovo in December 2008. Acting under an entirely self-created mandate, the EU thus managed to insert its mission, based explicitly on the provisions of the Ahtissari Plan, into Kosovo with Belgrade’s agreement.

That was the moment of Belgrade’s true capitulation. Everything else – the ICJ ruling included — is just a choreographed farce…

The ICJ opinion crowns two decades of U.S. policy in the former Yugoslavia that has been mendacious and iniquitous in equal measure. By retroactively condoning the Albanian UDI, the Court has made a massive leap into the unknown. That leap is potentially on par with Austria’s July 1914 ultimatum to Serbia. The fruits will be equally bitter.

Aiding and abetting Muslim designs in the Balkans, in the hope that this will earn some credit for the United States in the Islamic world, has been a major motive of American policy in the region since at least 1992. It has never yielded any dividends, of course, but repeated failure only prompts the architects of the policy to redouble their efforts.

It is virtually certain that Washington will be equally supportive of an independent Sanjak that would connect Kosovo with Bosnia, or of any other putative Islamistan, from western Macedonia to southern Bulgaria (“Eastern Rumelia”) to the Caucasus. The late Tom Lantos must be smiling approvingly wherever he is now, having called, three years ago, on “Jihadists of all color and hue” to take note of “yet another example that the United States leads the way for the creation of a predominantly Muslim country in the very heart of Europe.”

In the region, the ICJ verdict will encourage two distinct but interconnected trends: greater-Albanian aspirations against Macedonia, Montenegro, Greece, and rump-Serbia (Preševo), and pan-Islamic agitation for the completion of the Green Corridor – an Islamic belt anchored in Asia Minor and extending north-westward across the Balkans into the heart of Central Europe.

Beyond the Balkans, it will breed instability in each and every potential or actual separatist hotspot, from Galilee to Kashmir, from the Caucasus to Sinkiang.
Kosovo is now an expensive albatross costing American and European taxpayers a few billion a year. It will continue developing, not as a functional economy but as a black hole of criminality and terrorism. The ever-rising and constantly unfulfilled expectations of its unemployable multitudes will eventually turn – Frankenstein’s monster-like – against the entity’s creator. There will be many Ft. Dixes to come, over there and here at home.

God acts in mysterious ways. Kosovo had remained Serbian during those five long centuries of Ottoman darkness, to be liberated in 1912. It is no less Serbian now, the ugly farce in Priština and at The Hague notwithstanding. It will be tangibly Serbian again when the current experiment in global hegemonism collapses, and when the very names of its potentates and servants – Boris Tadić and Vuk Jeremić included – are consigned to the Recycle Bin of history.

Balkan studies, 22 jul 2010

Srdja Trifkovic: It is essential for the Jews to grasp that the survival of European gentile identity and institutions is a sine qua non of their own survival. It is desirable for the traditional Right to overcome its instinctive impulses, historically justified as they are, and to consider this possibility and its implications.

It is true, however, that the traditional Right is inevitably antipathetic to certain modes of thought and feeling, to a peculiar Weltanschauung and the resulting forms of public and intra-communal discourse, which are quite properly perceived as specifically Jewish.

Historically, Talmudic Judaism’s insistence on the Jews’ racial uniqueness — emphasized by the ritual and dietary laws of Talmudic Judaism and on its view of Christians as idolaters — has ensured that a Jew steeped in his own tradition could not view traditional European or American conservatism with sympathy. His tradition was a form of elaborate survival mechanism based on the zero-sum view of a world divided into “us” and “them.” The Gentile was “the Other” ab initio and for ever.

In addition, since the late 1800’s the Jews have had a disproportionate impact on a host of intellectual trends and political movements which have fundamentally altered the civilization of Europe and its overseas offspring in a manner deeply detrimental to the family, nation, culture, racial solidarity, social coherence, tradition, morality and faith. Spontaneously or deliberately, those ideas and movements — Marxism (including neoconservatism as the bastard child of Trotskyism), Freudianism, Frankfurt School cultural criticism, Boasian anthropology, etc. — have eroded “the West” to the point where its demographic and cultural survival is uncertain. The erosion is continuing, allegedly in the name of propositional principles and universal values, and it is pursued with escalating ferocity.

Only one group and one nation-state remain exempt from the dictates of pluralism and diversity, and from the condemnation (heading towards criminalization) of any form of group solidarity based on blood, culture and faith.

In our own time, however, the process of erosion has reached the stage where it is to be expected that increasing numbers of Jews — those who love their own people more than they loath what the traditional Right loves — will realize that, in the long term, their only viable survival strategy is to support the principles and objectives of the traditional Right.

To put it bluntly, the survival of the West which is recognizably Christian in spirit and European in genes is “objectively” becoming the optimal survival strategy for the Jewish community as a whole, Israel included. (I’ve known several Jews who understand, notably my late friend Sir Alfred Sherman.) In the postmodern mélange of races, cultures and cults still desired by the likes of Abraham Foxman, the narrative of victimhood and its associated claims will carry little weight with the brown, black, and yellow multitudes blissfully devoid of European self-loathing, guilt and shame. The results may easily exceed in ferocity and magnitude the events of 1942-45.

It is essential for the Jews to grasp that the survival of European gentile identity and institutions is a sine qua non of their own survival. It is desirable for the traditional Right to overcome its instinctive impulses, historically justified as they are, and to consider this possibility and its implications.

Alternative Right, 29 july 2010

“If Milorad Dodik (Prime Minister of Republika Srpska) decides to hold a referendum on separation, I will send the troops to divide the region inhabited by the Bosnian Serbs”,- the Croatian President said, adding that in case of success, a sovereign state of Bosnian Serbs will ‘seize to exist’. He made the announcement during an informal press-conference in Zagreb on January 18.

A military campaign against Banjaluka may be held simultaneously with an armed action by Kosovo`s Albanian authorities against the city of Kosovska Mitrovica and Serbian communities in Northern Kosovo. In this case the US, NATO and the EU will manage to complete separation of the Serbian territories. The Serbian Republic will be surrounded by hostile states and thus will be no longer able to carry out independent foreign policy. The defeat of the Kosovan and Bosnian Serbs will become Russia`s biggest loss in the Balkans over the past two decades and will harm Moscow’s attempts to play an active role in other strategically important regions in Eurasia.

The first reaction of Serbia and Russia to such rude interference of the Croatian leader into affairs of the neighboring state was surprisingly reserved. Serbia’s President Boris Tadic made an attempt to respond to the remarks made by his Croatian counterpart at the UN Security Council meeting on Kosovo on January 22. But he commented on the issue not during his main speech (though parallels between what was going on then in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo were more than obvious). He spoke during the debates because he found such kind of issues could not be discussed during official reports. Mr. Tadic also met the UN Chief Ban Ki-moon to tell him that Mesic`s ‘dangerous words were unwelcome in political discourse’ but immediately noted that Serbia did not want to worsen relations with Croatia.

Such peace-loving rhetoric was accepted in Zagreb. Croatia’s Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor told journalists that Serbia and Croatia should abandon debates and work together to develop neighborly relations. However, the Prime Minister did not disavow the President’s announcement.

Russia’s reaction is still too vague. Summing up the results of 2009 at the press-conference on January 22 in Moscow, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov commented on Mr. Mesic`s announcement: “We insist that all the sides involved respect the Dayton Agreement and avoid the use of force”. (1)

Meanwhile, the way the situation is developing in the region in recent months proves quite the contrary: the West and the leaders of Sarajevo are definitely going to undermine the Dayton agreement. Two rounds of talks held by the heads of the Bosnian political parties in October 2009 at a NATO base in Butmir outside Sarajevo, revealed the the western strategy toward Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs are demanded to abdicate their authorities settled in the Dayton Peace Agreement. Though formally Russia is a member of the Dayton Agreement Peace Implementation Council, it did not take part in the discussions in Butmir. So, it would be a fatal mistake to expect the US, EU and NATO to abandon their new political course. It would also mean to be inexcusably weak in regard to Russia’s interests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Balkans in general.

It was not accidentally that the International Crisis Group, which traditionally deals with promoting the western political propaganda in conflict regions, in every detail commented on the future of the Balkans a few months before the recent events. Experts in the Group believe that Moscow and Belgrade remain the West`s major rivals in the region because “an international approach to the Balkans is dominated by concern over Serbia`s reaction to the independence of Kosovo”. In their opinion, Russia “has become stronger to oppose to the Western policy it sees hostile to its interests”. (2)

Under these circumstances, Moscow should better revise its policy in the Balkans. Russian diplomats should no longer view the Dayton agreements as too weak to withstand political attacks. This all will make it logical to put in question political status of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This approach will help Moscow no longer be an outsider in Bosnia and launch a series of international talks on territorial, political and ethnocultural problems in the Balkans, where peoples and their interests are in jeopardy. Taking into consideration intentions of the West to put an end to the Serbian Orthodox community in the Balkans, revision of the existing borders in the conflict regions may become the only way for Russia to defend its interests. As of today, there are at least three self-proclaimed states which statuses are being doubted: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Their territorial and administrative revision could become the least painful way to avoid new wars in the Balkans.

It is remarkable that recently the authorities of Sarajevo have been urging Russia to contribute to the ‘implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement’, the Bosniak Muslim member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Silajdzic, said at the meeting with the Russian special envoy for Kosovo, Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko. And this is a very disturbing sign because Silajdzic has long been known for his extremist views about Republika Srpska. The majority of people in Western Europe cannot but be aware that the Bosnian Serbs remain the only counterbalance to radical pan-Islamic tendencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this it what gives Russia the right to boost its activities in the Balkans.

Dr. Pyotr A. Iskenderov is a historian, senior researcher at the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Science, and the Vremya Novostey and the Voice of Russia radio station international politics commentator.

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=17551

Notes

(1) http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf

(2) Bosnia`s Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe. Sarajevo-Brussels, 2009. P.14

Gerard Gallucci

Sovereignty is usually thought to be indivisible, zero sum.  But quantum physics tells us that reality may simply be in the eye of the beholder.  This insight could offer the key to unlocking the Kosovo status problem.  Perhaps both sides – Belgrade and Pristina – can get what they want by seeing status each in their own way, with nods and winks from the rest of us.

The concept of sovereignty goes back to the age of kings.  Ever since mankind has lived in groupings larger than clans, who gets to be the boss and why have been central political issues.  Kings and emperors claimed authority through descent from the gods. When the divine-right sovereigns were finally overthrown, sovereignty came to rest on the people or nation.  Wikipedia defines sovereignty as the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a territory and adds that it can be found in a power to rule and make law that rests on a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided.  Sovereignty is the claim to rule over a place that has as its basis the assertion of that claim.  Of course, not all claims to sovereignty are recognized or actionable.

During recent debate and speculation about Kosovo’s status and possible renewed diplomatic efforts after the ICJ renders its judgment, there has been increased mention of a possible scenario that could be seen as a way to sidestep the sovereignty issue and also avoid partition.  At the core of such a solution would be increased autonomy for the Serbs north of the Ibar and some form of role for Serbia vis-à-vis the southern Serbs and the Church.  This would have to go somewhat further than the Ahtisaari Plan, which left important details – of how Pristina and Belgrade would have to interact to enable local self-rule and to operationalize links to Serbia – either unsettled or open to manipulation or blockage by the Kosovo government.  For the north, links to Pristina would probably have to be kept minimal while in the south, where the Serbs must live in the midst of independent Kosovo, such links would have to be somewhat more organic.  The role of Belgrade would be a mirror image of this. In the north, local institutions would function in practice as part of Serbia while in the south, Belgrade would have defined access and the ability to support local Serb communities but no role in governing them.  Oversight of the Church (and Church land) might be done simply as a matter of the recognized authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church.  All of this would require agreed and clear rules of the road – and the devil is always in the details – and close monitoring and supervision by the internationals.

During recent debate and speculation about Kosovo’s status and possible renewed diplomatic efforts after the ICJ renders its judgment, there has been increased mention of a possible scenario that could be seen as a way to sidestep the sovereignty issue and also avoid partition. At the core of such a solution would be increased autonomy for the Serbs north of the Ibar and some form of role for Serbia vis-à-vis the southern Serbs and the Church. This would have to go somewhat further than the Ahtisaari Plan, which left important details – of how Pristina and Belgrade would have to interact to enable local self-rule and to operationalize links to Serbia – either unsettled or open to manipulation or blockage by the Kosovo government.

As difficult as the negotiations might be to settle these Ahtisaari-plus elements of a possible agreement, it would still leave the question of status and how local Serb autonomy would be “dressed up” (i.e., what uniforms would the Serb police wear, what flags would fly and where, who gets any customs fees, how would Serbian courts in the north and Kosovo courts in the south relate, what utility companies can operate and where).  But autonomy itself need not be the problem.

When the Western supporters of Kosovo independence first designed the Ahtisaari Plan, it was seen as a way of avoiding creation of autonomous ethnic regions such as was done in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).  Conventional wisdom held that this had led to continuing problems in BiH and should not be repeated elsewhere.  But increased autonomy – within the boundaries of Kosovo – may make more sense there than in BiH, where autonomy could be seen to challenge the status of the state boundaries as defined by the pre-existing Yugoslav republic.  (The war in BiH was, after all, an effort to carve up that state.)  In the case of Kosovo, both Belgrade and Pristina agree that its boundaries are not in question and both continue to reject partition.  This could offer real grounds for compromise.  Belgrade could continue to claim that all of Kosovo remains part of Serbia but limit itself to exercising some form of control over the north and only access in the south (vis-à-vis the southern Serbs).  Pristina could maintain that its borders and independence are inviolate.  Serbia would not have to recognize Kosovo independence (nor would the EU insist) but Pristina would presumably also get Serbia’s quiet acquiescence to Kosovo being further incorporated into the international system (including the UN).

An agreement along these lines is certainly conceivable and could be achieved if the parties both understood that they were expected to reach a mutually acceptable solution in which neither would necessarily receive all they want.  Agreement within a resuscitated Contact Group – U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia – to keep the two sides at the table and to not allow either to simply stone-wall would be essential.  The Western Quint countries also would have to resist seeking to simply impose the current “solution” that has so clearly not resolved the Kosovo status issue so far.

There might eventually be a new UNSCR resolution and a continued UN role in Kosovo – or at least in the north – may remain necessary for some time with a more effective EULEX perhaps allowed to try to get it right in the south.

Behind all this would be the possibility that both sides could see the issue of sovereignty over Kosovo in their own way and be left to do so. Serbia could continue to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo, as could the government in Pristina.

Behind all this would be the possibility that both sides could see the issue of sovereignty over Kosovo in their own way and be left to do so.  Serbia could continue to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo, as could the government in Pristina.  The Serbs would have a high degree of local self-rule within what everyone recognized as Kosovo.  The Albanians would be able to take comfort in the fact that Serbia would not formally rule any part of Kosovo.  With both sides getting the international support and “tough love” required to make this complicated formula work, and over time, perhaps the issue of Kosovo status could be subsumed within membership in the EU.

Perhaps some will still say that this would only “freeze” the Kosovo conflict and not resolve it.  But this misses the point that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo remains at this time irresolvable except perhaps through using force to drive one or the other side off the field.  A detailed and practical agreement to disagree on sovereignty may be the best outcome for now.  There could be much to talk about after the ICJ rules.  Maybe the preliminaries can start now.  Maybe they already have?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008.

TransConflict

Protests by ethnic Albanians over the Easter period against the return of twenty-six Serb families to the village of Zac, near Istok in the Pec district of north-western Kosovo, have once again shed light on the problems affecting internally displaced persons (IDPs). The lacklustre return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to Kosovo has long constituted a major failure of the international presence in Kosovo; one that undermines assertions of Kosovo’s supposedly multi-ethnic character. Without further steps to ensure the sustainable return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities, the prospects for conflict transformation in Kosovo look bleak.

Eduardo Arboleda, the head of UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) in Serbia, insists that “the return of displaced persons literally stopped” following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. According to UNHCR statistics, only 631 persons returned to Kosovo last year, leaving some 205,835 registered Serb IDPs from Kosovo; with some estimates suggesting that a further 20,000 Serbs remain IDPs inside Kosovo itself. In response to these protests, Serbia’s secretary of state for Kosovo and Metohija, Oliver Ivanovic, has called upon the international community to “send a clear message to Albanians about their position over this, if their statements about supporting the return of Serbs are in fact sincere”.

A highly-critical report published last summer by Minority Rights Group International (MRG) detailed how members of minority communities were leaving Kosovo due to persistent exclusion and discrimination. Entitled ‘Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in Kosovo’, the report concluded that Kosovo “lacks effective international protection for minorities, which is worsening the situation for smaller minorities and forcing some to leave the country for good”. These minorities include not only Kosovo’s Serbs, but also Ashkali, Bosniaks, Croats, Egyptians, Gorani, Roma and Turks, who together make up around 5% of the population of Kosovo according to local estimates.

The lacklustre return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to Kosovo has long constituted a major failure of the international presence in Kosovo; one that undermines assertions of Kosovo’s supposedly multi-ethnic character. Without further steps to ensure the sustainable return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities, the prospects for conflict transformation in Kosovo look bleak.

MRG’s report also goes on to describe how “a lack of political will among majority Albanians and poor investment in protection mechanisms have resulted in minority rights being eroded or compromised in the post-independence period” and that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence has left “a vacuum in effective international protection for minorities”.

A spate of recent incidents have highlighted the lack of security guarantees that only provide a further disincentive for potential returnees. KFOR, for instance, recently condemned the desecration of several tombs in the village of Rabovce, near Lipljan in central Kosovo, emphasizing that “such incidents jeopardize productive and decent coexistence”. The grave of an ethnic Serb woman, meanwhile, the first to be buried in Gnjilane cemetery since 1999, was also vandalized. The on-going failure to tackle deficiencies in the area of the rule of law has further contributed to the plight of Kosovo’s minorities.

Mark Lattimer, the executive director of MRG, also emphasised how “restrictions of movement and political, social and economic exclusion are particularly experienced by smaller minorities”. Such conditions have been further aggravated by the worsening economic situation in Kosovo, especially for the Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma communities that suffer from deeply ingrained poverty and marginalisation.

Arboleda, however, criticised some displaced persons for not accepting the conditions offered and for demanding “really new houses and cable TV with Serb channels”. Arboleda added that, “we are under obligation to offer assistance to each returnee, but there are conditions – UNHCR is not a development agency, we can only repair houses that were damaged slightly”.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo recently issued a report, entitled “In Pursuit of Durable Solutions for those Displaced in the Collective Centres in Strpce/Shterpce Municipality”, which described the conditions of some 700 displaced Kosovo Serbs and Serb refugees from Croatia living in collective centres and social housing as “appalling”. The report called upon the local authorities – who “have done little to encourage displaced persons to return” – to provide sustainable solutions, including the provision of better housing conditions and electricity.

Eduardo Arboleda, the head of UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) in Serbia, insists that “the return of displaced persons literally stopped” following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. According to UNHCR statistics, only 631 persons returned to Kosovo last year, leaving some 205,835 registered Serb IDPs from Kosovo; with some estimates suggesting that a further 20,000 Serbs remain IDPs inside Kosovo itself.

The situation is such that the Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights, Thomas Hammarberg, has called on European countries to halt the forced return of refugees – primarily Roma – until the Kosovo authorities provide adequate living conditions, social services, employment and health care. Hammarberg insisted that, “a quick deportation from European countries now to Kosovo is irresponsible…the majority of those who are sent back are leaving Kosovo again and trying to reach other parts of Europe”.

This latest series of protests has refocused attention on the insufficient political will to ensure the sustainable return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to Kosovo. In the absence of basic security guarantees and adequate living conditions, the prospect for future returns continues to diminish, despite statements to the contrary from both domestic and and international actors. The litany of failures with respect to minority rights have only been further exacerbated and entrenched by Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Contending with the problems faced by IDPs, however, is key to alleviating a persistent source of tension and instability throughout the entire Western Balkans.

Ian Bancroft is the co-founder of TransConflict and a regular columnist for The Guardian on Western Balkan affairs.

TransConflict

A leading Serbian expert in the field says the NATO’s use of depleted uranium ammunition in it’s aggression on Serbia has caused enormous increase in cancer rates and number of newborns with genetic malformations.

Silent killer

“Depleted uranium is not only radioactive, it is very toxic as well,” says doctor Radomir Kovacevic, an expert of the Institute for radiology protection “Dr. Dragomir Karajovic” in Belgrade. In an interview for VJ Movement, he explains “Primary it is nephrotoxic, so it affects kidneys, then liver and spleen. Actually, the whole organism is affected from the aspect of toxicity, it is poisoned.”.

Four studies conducted so far, on both civilians and those who worked on the spots’decontamination, have shown that the DU exposure causes typical and specific changes on genetic material.

“DNA molecule is very sensitive on aggression – in this case it is radioactivity. Experimental oncology has shown 18 years ago that in the etiopathogenesis of malignity precedes one genotoxic stadium and that is exactly what is visible on those chromosomes,” tells doctor Kovacevic, stating that the information obtained so far is enough to link the DU contamination to increase in cancer rates.

In Kosovo, none of more than a hundred known DU contaminated locations has been cleaned.
Foreign personnel has been warned to stay clear of those areas unless with full radiological protective clothing.
But no one warned civilians.

Threat to newborn lives

In Vranje area, which is surrounded by four known DU contaminated locations, there has been an enormous increase in cancer rates and number of newborns with genetic malformations. “In 1998, 21 children have been born with deformities. In 2008 there were 73,” says Nela Cvetkovic, a Member of the Vranje City Council, in a statement for VJM. The number of newborn didn’t change, it is about 800-1000 babies per year.

At the same time, in a six year period after the NATO bombing a number of newly registered cancer cases has more than doubled – from 185 in the year 2000 to 398 new diagnosis in 2006.

Permanent consequences

“The half-life of uranium 238 is very long – 4,5 billion years,” reminds nuclear physicist Miroslav Simic, stating that “this way of throwing away the nuclear waste on civil, but also military targets, is not human as the consequences are permanent.”

Traces of uranium 236 and some plutonium isotopes found on bombed locations suggest that at least a part of the material in the projectiles had originated from reprocessing nuclear fuel.

“Plutonium is one million times more toxic than uranium,” says Mr Simic in an interview for VJM, and explains that “one particle of plutonium which would enter a human body is enough to cause fatal consequences”.

“Plutonium is one million times more toxic than uranium,” says Mr Simic in an interview for VJM, and explains that “one particle of plutonium which would enter a human body is enough to cause fatal consequences”.

At the same time in Kosovo, doctor Nebojsa Srbljak, who researches the health consequences of the bombing on civil population, accuses NATO of using so-called dirty bombs. “We first started researching when we found traces of Iodine 131 in the tissue extracted from one patient,” he says, adding that Iodine 131, also known as radio iodine, is well known as a major factor in health consequences of nuclear disaster in Chernobyl.

Price for Kosovo independence

In Kosovo, none of more than a hundred known DU contaminated locations has been cleaned. Foreign personnel has been warned to stay clear of those areas unless with full radiological protective clothing. But no one warned civilians.

“We, the doctors know what it is, politicians are silent to please their mentors. But the people are in the worst position as there are new cancer cases among young persons every day,” says doctor Srbljak, adding that the data on health statistics of Albanian population is completely unavailable.

The global Research

Balkans: Depleted Uraniumin Nato Bombs Remains Today”: Video

Serbia’s boycott of the recent regional summit in Slovenia epitomises the mounting challenges facing regional co-operation in the western Balkans following Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Though Serbia will not be formally asked by the EU to recognise Kosovo, in part because of a lack of consensus over the latter’s status, the accession requirement of “good neighbourly relations” is increasingly being employed to pressure Serbia into at least de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence. With the Kosovo issue set to return to the domestic spotlight in Serbia following the international court of justice’s ruling, pragmatic solutions are urgently required to ensure that regional co-operation avoids further rupture and paralysis.

Serbia has clearly indicated that it does not oppose Kosovo’s participation in regional forums, provided that it is represented by UNMIK officials as “Kosovo-UNMIK”, in accordance with UN security council resolution 1244 which, ultimately, continues to govern the status of the territory. The proposed alternative – “without names of states and only with names of participants” – was rejected by Serbia on the grounds that it would constitute tacit recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

Entitled Together for the European Union: Contribution of the Western Balkans to the European Future, the summit, which was jointly organised by the prime ministers of Slovenia and Croatia, was largely devoid of EU representation, with Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European council, cancelling his participation at the last minute, after Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, had earlier rejected an invitation to attend. The EU’s new enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fule, left the summit early, hinting at the EU’s growing scepticism towards further enlargement amid a plethora of regional disputes revolving around issues of sovereignty and territory.

Though Serbia will not be formally asked by the EU to recognise Kosovo, in part because of a lack of consensus over the latter’s status, the accession requirement of “good neighbourly relations” is increasingly being employed to pressure Serbia into at least de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence

The representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which has also not recognised Kosovo, primarily due to the stance of Bosnia’s Serbs – by Nikola Spiric, the chairman of the council of ministers and a member of Milorad Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), meanwhile, was designed to prevent Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak member of the country’s presidency, from tacitly recognising Kosovo’s independence. Accordingly, Spiric left the proceedings once it was the turn of Hashim Thaci, the prime minister of Kosovo, to speak; thereby sending “a clear message to Europe”, in the words of Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska.

Spain, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU, is planning to organise a regional summit in Sarajevo this June, which according to Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain’s foreign minister, will be “guided by international law” and an “appreciation … [of] all sensitive issues”. Under the guise of good neighbourly relations, however, Serbia is increasingly being pressured to make further concessions with respect to Kosovo. Germany’s ambassador to Serbia, Wolfram Maas, in a statement full of internal contradictions, insisted that “there are no new conditions for Serbia’s further European integration, they are the same as for all other candidates. A request for Kosovo to be recognised as an independent state by Serbia was never made. However, good regional co-operation and good neighbourly relations are a part of the preconditions for membership in the EU. For us, Kosovo is Serbia’s neighbour”. Such views echo those made by Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, during a recent visit to Belgrade.

The Serbian government’s scope for manoeuvre, however, continues to narrow as the issue of Kosovo’s status once again begins to have a notable impact on Serbian domestic politics. Former prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Vojislav Kostunica, for instance, has repeatedly called on the government to clarify the EU’s stance on Kosovo, emphasising that “the government should not be allowed, without the approval of the parliament, to enter negotiations on new agreements, especially not on implementing good neighbourly relations with Kosovo”. Though largely written off following the last elections, the DSS have reached an agreement on closer co-operation with Serbia’s main opposition parties – New Serbia (NS) and the Serbian Progressive party (SNS) of the former Serbian Radical party member, Tomislav Nikolic. With the SNS regularly polling neck-and-neck with President Tadic’s Democratic party (DS), this agreement could lay the basis for a future coalition government that would certainly pursue a tougher stance on Kosovo.

Two key elements of the EU’s accession criteria – regional co-operation and good neighbourly relations – are increasingly being applied by specific EU member states to exert greater pressure on Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo. The ongoing name dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), however, demonstrates the intractability of such issues in the absence of compromises from both parties. As Slovenia and Croatia have themselves discovered, international law and arbitration provide the best means for securing such compromises, particularly where disputes over territory and sovereignty are concerned. For the sake of regional co-operation in, and by extension the European perspective of, the western Balkans, the ICJ’s ruling will provide an important chance for Europe to reassert its commitment to negotiated solutions. If the EU fails to grasp this opportunity, it will face a hardening of positions that will further undermine its leverage in the western Balkans.

The Guardian

The “Quint” has been vocal in recent months in attacking Serbia’s approach towards Kosovo.  Serbia’s argument against the independence of Kosovo has centred around international law and UNSC Resolution 1244.  It claims that unilaterally declared independence violates the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, according to which a new state cannot be formed on the territory of an existing state without the agreement of that state.  As Serbia did not agree to independence, it has deemed the declaration to be illegal.  It would seem that the Quint is running out of patience with Serbia, as it recently released a statement to its Foreign Ministry saying, “We have tolerated until now the Serbian aggressive rhetoric regarding Kosovo, because we believed that with time passing it could be taken off the agenda.”

It would seem that the Quint is running out of patience with Serbia, as it recently released a statement to its Foreign Ministry saying, “We have tolerated until now the Serbian aggressive rhetoric regarding Kosovo, because we believed that with time passing it could be taken off the agenda.”

The interpretation of this is interesting.  On the face of it, it may seem that the Quint countries consider it time to move on for both Kosovo and Serbia, and that repetition of the same argument by Serbia is preventing progress.  Kosovo, now independent, needs to strengthen its economy, become stable and peaceful and tackle organised crime.  It can only really deal with these problems by having a defined status, even if that status has been achieved through a unilateral declaration.  Serbia has aspirations to join the European Union, and must work towards satisfying various criteria in order to make this a reality.  It has been hinted previously that Serbia must accept that Kosovo is now independent if it is move forward in this direction.  Although this makes sense, it is probable that the Quint’s objections to Serbia’s “rhetoric” run deeper.

In December 2009, the International Court of Justice heard evidence from Serbia and other interested parties relating to the legality of Kosovo’s independence.  The hearings were held at Serbia’s request and a decision is expected later this year.  It is hoped by Serbia that the Court will rule in its favour and there can then be a return to negotiations.  Serbia’s success in bringing this legal challenge is perceived as a threat to independence.  Whilst it is unlikely that independence would ever be revoked on this basis, an outcome in favour of Serbia’s position would nevertheless weaken the case.  The Quint, being fearful of this, has consequently asked Serbia to tone its legal argument down.

The Quint has admitted what many of those recognising independence have privately been hoping – that by tolerating this argument, the Serbs would soon realise that nothing will bring Kosovo back, and that instead it would be better to concentrate on gaining entry to the European Union – thus the issue of Kosovo would fall from the political agenda leaving the West free to implement the Ahtisaari plan unimpeded.

Then there is the issue of UNSCR 1244, which is being used by both sides to defend their position.  A recent remark by an international official in Kosovo referred to the Serb parallel structures in the north of Kosovo as being in violation of UNSCR 1244.  The official stated that the Resolution does not allow for parallel structures and that any form of violation causes instability.  One can see the logic in this and cannot disagree with the fact that violations could indeed result in instability.  However, the statement is somewhat contradictory because it is obviously acceptable for Kosovo to unilaterally declare itself independent in violation of the resolution, but not acceptable for Serbs to establish parallel structures in the north of Kosovo (where they are a majority) also in violation of the resolution.  Either both sides should be allowed to violate the Resolution in circumstances they consider necessary – in which case it ought to be declared void – or neither side should do it.  Consistency is of the essence here.  Selective application does not work because if one side violates the Resolution, the other will see it as permissible to do so too.

To what extent have both sides actually violated UNSCR 1244?  Whilst there is nothing in the Resolution to support the establishment of parallel Serb structures, there is nothing to specifically prevent it either.  However, because Kosovo is now independent, the parallel structures are seen to undermine its status, thus amounting to a breach of the Resolution, as it was no doubt intended that whatever status Kosovo eventually assumed, it would be respected.  Crucially, as the Resolution does not say what Kosovo’s status should be, there is nothing to prevent Kosovo becoming independent, and independence in itself is not a violation of the Resolution.  However, it is the fact that the independence was unilaterally declared without the agreement of Serbia, which is considered to be a breach of the Resolution.  The creation of Serb parallel structures cannot be considered a violation if the status is illegitimate in the first place.  If both sides had agreed to the independence, the Resolution would have been respected and Serb parallel structures would never have appeared.

This highlights the importance of obtaining a negotiated settlement, which although difficult to achieve, would not be impossible.  Ultimately, the issue is not about whether Kosovo should become independent, but about what can be achieved by both sides.  In other words, obtaining an agreement.  With the right opportunities, unlimited time and freedom from external interference, it would be interesting to see exactly what could be achieved.  Perhaps ironically both would agree to independence, or perhaps something entirely different that no-one has envisaged so far.

Frances Maria Peacock is a British analyst

I’ve noted the interview given by the Italian Ambassador to Pristina, who also functions as EU envoy to the north. He emphasized a less confrontational approach to the north focusing on improving the daily lives of the people. The Ambassador will reportedly open the Europe House someplace in north Mitrovica on March 26. (Its location seems not entirely clear to the locals but the common suspicion is apparently that it may be co-located with the police.) Finding ways to help the locals in an ethnically divided environment, without running into political issues related to status and the desire of each community to gain or hold their ground, will be a challenge. But the effort is worth making and hopefully he will draw on the expertise and connections of the local UNMIK office to navigate the difficult waters without provoking further conflict (such as over renewed construction in Brdjani).

The question facing the EU in the north is, however, much broader. Although it seems that the EU has decided to leave aside the EUSR’s northern strategy, everything it does in the north potentially raises status issues. This is especially true of EULEX. WAZ quotes an unnamed Brussels source saying that it is not enough for EULEX “to have just a symbolic presence in the north as it was until now. All 27 EU member countries support EULEX and there shouldn’t be difference in the work of EULEX between the north and south banks of the River Ibar.” But there is a difference. As the locals see it, on one side of the River it is independent Kosovo and on the other it remains Serbia.

EULEX officials reportedly have decided to take a higher profile at the two boundary crossings in the north with “checks … to secure the highest level of security and to make sure that materials that could pose threat to security in Kosovo are not brought in at these crossings.” These checks would be carried out by “EULEX, KPS, and customs officials.” Two potential issues here: 1. Whose customs regulations and officials would be used – Kosovo government personnel and law or internationals using UNMIK regulations? 2. Would the personnel sent to the Gates include Kosovo Albanians? Use of Kosovo Customs regulations or officials at the Gates would not be status neutral. And it was the appearance of Kosovo Albanian police at the Gates on February 19, 2008 that was the proximate cause for their being attacked.

The WAZ sources apparently suggested that “several important EU capitals still fear that Serbia is intent on creating problems in Kosovo rather than looking for pragmatic solutions.” But perhaps it is this impatience with Belgrade’s understandable defense of its position on Kosovo, and the resultant wish to somehow force events, that remains the greatest threat to peace and order in Kosovo and to the EU’s own efforts to win hearts and minds.

Any progress on the courts would also require decisions on which law and what court to use. Allowing time for Ambassador Giffoni to try his approach without the complications of further one-sided actions from EULEX might make most sense. This goes as well for how the new construction season is handled in Brdjani.

The WAZ sources apparently suggested that “several important EU capitals still fear that Serbia is intent on creating problems in Kosovo rather than looking for pragmatic solutions.” But perhaps it is this impatience with Belgrade’s understandable defense of its position on Kosovo, and the resultant wish to somehow force events, that remains the greatest threat to peace and order in Kosovo and to the EU’s own efforts to win hearts and minds.

Outside The Walls