Gerard Gallucci

Sovereignty is usually thought to be indivisible, zero sum.  But quantum physics tells us that reality may simply be in the eye of the beholder.  This insight could offer the key to unlocking the Kosovo status problem.  Perhaps both sides – Belgrade and Pristina – can get what they want by seeing status each in their own way, with nods and winks from the rest of us.

The concept of sovereignty goes back to the age of kings.  Ever since mankind has lived in groupings larger than clans, who gets to be the boss and why have been central political issues.  Kings and emperors claimed authority through descent from the gods. When the divine-right sovereigns were finally overthrown, sovereignty came to rest on the people or nation.  Wikipedia defines sovereignty as the quality of having supreme, independent authority over a territory and adds that it can be found in a power to rule and make law that rests on a political fact for which no purely legal explanation can be provided.  Sovereignty is the claim to rule over a place that has as its basis the assertion of that claim.  Of course, not all claims to sovereignty are recognized or actionable.

During recent debate and speculation about Kosovo’s status and possible renewed diplomatic efforts after the ICJ renders its judgment, there has been increased mention of a possible scenario that could be seen as a way to sidestep the sovereignty issue and also avoid partition.  At the core of such a solution would be increased autonomy for the Serbs north of the Ibar and some form of role for Serbia vis-à-vis the southern Serbs and the Church.  This would have to go somewhat further than the Ahtisaari Plan, which left important details – of how Pristina and Belgrade would have to interact to enable local self-rule and to operationalize links to Serbia – either unsettled or open to manipulation or blockage by the Kosovo government.  For the north, links to Pristina would probably have to be kept minimal while in the south, where the Serbs must live in the midst of independent Kosovo, such links would have to be somewhat more organic.  The role of Belgrade would be a mirror image of this. In the north, local institutions would function in practice as part of Serbia while in the south, Belgrade would have defined access and the ability to support local Serb communities but no role in governing them.  Oversight of the Church (and Church land) might be done simply as a matter of the recognized authority of the Serbian Orthodox Church.  All of this would require agreed and clear rules of the road – and the devil is always in the details – and close monitoring and supervision by the internationals.

During recent debate and speculation about Kosovo’s status and possible renewed diplomatic efforts after the ICJ renders its judgment, there has been increased mention of a possible scenario that could be seen as a way to sidestep the sovereignty issue and also avoid partition. At the core of such a solution would be increased autonomy for the Serbs north of the Ibar and some form of role for Serbia vis-à-vis the southern Serbs and the Church. This would have to go somewhat further than the Ahtisaari Plan, which left important details – of how Pristina and Belgrade would have to interact to enable local self-rule and to operationalize links to Serbia – either unsettled or open to manipulation or blockage by the Kosovo government.

As difficult as the negotiations might be to settle these Ahtisaari-plus elements of a possible agreement, it would still leave the question of status and how local Serb autonomy would be “dressed up” (i.e., what uniforms would the Serb police wear, what flags would fly and where, who gets any customs fees, how would Serbian courts in the north and Kosovo courts in the south relate, what utility companies can operate and where).  But autonomy itself need not be the problem.

When the Western supporters of Kosovo independence first designed the Ahtisaari Plan, it was seen as a way of avoiding creation of autonomous ethnic regions such as was done in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).  Conventional wisdom held that this had led to continuing problems in BiH and should not be repeated elsewhere.  But increased autonomy – within the boundaries of Kosovo – may make more sense there than in BiH, where autonomy could be seen to challenge the status of the state boundaries as defined by the pre-existing Yugoslav republic.  (The war in BiH was, after all, an effort to carve up that state.)  In the case of Kosovo, both Belgrade and Pristina agree that its boundaries are not in question and both continue to reject partition.  This could offer real grounds for compromise.  Belgrade could continue to claim that all of Kosovo remains part of Serbia but limit itself to exercising some form of control over the north and only access in the south (vis-à-vis the southern Serbs).  Pristina could maintain that its borders and independence are inviolate.  Serbia would not have to recognize Kosovo independence (nor would the EU insist) but Pristina would presumably also get Serbia’s quiet acquiescence to Kosovo being further incorporated into the international system (including the UN).

An agreement along these lines is certainly conceivable and could be achieved if the parties both understood that they were expected to reach a mutually acceptable solution in which neither would necessarily receive all they want.  Agreement within a resuscitated Contact Group – U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia – to keep the two sides at the table and to not allow either to simply stone-wall would be essential.  The Western Quint countries also would have to resist seeking to simply impose the current “solution” that has so clearly not resolved the Kosovo status issue so far.

There might eventually be a new UNSCR resolution and a continued UN role in Kosovo – or at least in the north – may remain necessary for some time with a more effective EULEX perhaps allowed to try to get it right in the south.

Behind all this would be the possibility that both sides could see the issue of sovereignty over Kosovo in their own way and be left to do so. Serbia could continue to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo, as could the government in Pristina.

Behind all this would be the possibility that both sides could see the issue of sovereignty over Kosovo in their own way and be left to do so.  Serbia could continue to claim sovereignty over all of Kosovo, as could the government in Pristina.  The Serbs would have a high degree of local self-rule within what everyone recognized as Kosovo.  The Albanians would be able to take comfort in the fact that Serbia would not formally rule any part of Kosovo.  With both sides getting the international support and “tough love” required to make this complicated formula work, and over time, perhaps the issue of Kosovo status could be subsumed within membership in the EU.

Perhaps some will still say that this would only “freeze” the Kosovo conflict and not resolve it.  But this misses the point that the conflict between Serbs and Albanians over Kosovo remains at this time irresolvable except perhaps through using force to drive one or the other side off the field.  A detailed and practical agreement to disagree on sovereignty may be the best outcome for now.  There could be much to talk about after the ICJ rules.  Maybe the preliminaries can start now.  Maybe they already have?

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008.

TransConflict

Ian Bancroft

Protests by ethnic Albanians over the Easter period against the return of twenty-six Serb families to the village of Zac, near Istok in the Pec district of north-western Kosovo, have once again shed light on the problems affecting internally displaced persons (IDPs). The lacklustre return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to Kosovo has long constituted a major failure of the international presence in Kosovo; one that undermines assertions of Kosovo’s supposedly multi-ethnic character. Without further steps to ensure the sustainable return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities, the prospects for conflict transformation in Kosovo look bleak.

Eduardo Arboleda, the head of UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) in Serbia, insists that “the return of displaced persons literally stopped” following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. According to UNHCR statistics, only 631 persons returned to Kosovo last year, leaving some 205,835 registered Serb IDPs from Kosovo; with some estimates suggesting that a further 20,000 Serbs remain IDPs inside Kosovo itself. In response to these protests, Serbia’s secretary of state for Kosovo and Metohija, Oliver Ivanovic, has called upon the international community to “send a clear message to Albanians about their position over this, if their statements about supporting the return of Serbs are in fact sincere”.

A highly-critical report published last summer by Minority Rights Group International (MRG) detailed how members of minority communities were leaving Kosovo due to persistent exclusion and discrimination. Entitled ‘Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in Kosovo’, the report concluded that Kosovo “lacks effective international protection for minorities, which is worsening the situation for smaller minorities and forcing some to leave the country for good”. These minorities include not only Kosovo’s Serbs, but also Ashkali, Bosniaks, Croats, Egyptians, Gorani, Roma and Turks, who together make up around 5% of the population of Kosovo according to local estimates.

The lacklustre return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to Kosovo has long constituted a major failure of the international presence in Kosovo; one that undermines assertions of Kosovo’s supposedly multi-ethnic character. Without further steps to ensure the sustainable return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities, the prospects for conflict transformation in Kosovo look bleak.

MRG’s report also goes on to describe how “a lack of political will among majority Albanians and poor investment in protection mechanisms have resulted in minority rights being eroded or compromised in the post-independence period” and that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence has left “a vacuum in effective international protection for minorities”.

A spate of recent incidents have highlighted the lack of security guarantees that only provide a further disincentive for potential returnees. KFOR, for instance, recently condemned the desecration of several tombs in the village of Rabovce, near Lipljan in central Kosovo, emphasizing that “such incidents jeopardize productive and decent coexistence”. The grave of an ethnic Serb woman, meanwhile, the first to be buried in Gnjilane cemetery since 1999, was also vandalized. The on-going failure to tackle deficiencies in the area of the rule of law has further contributed to the plight of Kosovo’s minorities.

Mark Lattimer, the executive director of MRG, also emphasised how “restrictions of movement and political, social and economic exclusion are particularly experienced by smaller minorities”. Such conditions have been further aggravated by the worsening economic situation in Kosovo, especially for the Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma communities that suffer from deeply ingrained poverty and marginalisation.

Arboleda, however, criticised some displaced persons for not accepting the conditions offered and for demanding “really new houses and cable TV with Serb channels”. Arboleda added that, “we are under obligation to offer assistance to each returnee, but there are conditions – UNHCR is not a development agency, we can only repair houses that were damaged slightly”.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo recently issued a report, entitled “In Pursuit of Durable Solutions for those Displaced in the Collective Centres in Strpce/Shterpce Municipality”, which described the conditions of some 700 displaced Kosovo Serbs and Serb refugees from Croatia living in collective centres and social housing as “appalling”. The report called upon the local authorities – who “have done little to encourage displaced persons to return” – to provide sustainable solutions, including the provision of better housing conditions and electricity.

Eduardo Arboleda, the head of UNHCR (the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) in Serbia, insists that “the return of displaced persons literally stopped” following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. According to UNHCR statistics, only 631 persons returned to Kosovo last year, leaving some 205,835 registered Serb IDPs from Kosovo; with some estimates suggesting that a further 20,000 Serbs remain IDPs inside Kosovo itself.

The situation is such that the Council of Europe’s commissioner for human rights, Thomas Hammarberg, has called on European countries to halt the forced return of refugees – primarily Roma – until the Kosovo authorities provide adequate living conditions, social services, employment and health care. Hammarberg insisted that, “a quick deportation from European countries now to Kosovo is irresponsible…the majority of those who are sent back are leaving Kosovo again and trying to reach other parts of Europe”.

This latest series of protests has refocused attention on the insufficient political will to ensure the sustainable return of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to Kosovo. In the absence of basic security guarantees and adequate living conditions, the prospect for future returns continues to diminish, despite statements to the contrary from both domestic and and international actors. The litany of failures with respect to minority rights have only been further exacerbated and entrenched by Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Contending with the problems faced by IDPs, however, is key to alleviating a persistent source of tension and instability throughout the entire Western Balkans.

Ian Bancroft is the co-founder of TransConflict and a regular columnist for The Guardian on Western Balkan affairs.

TransConflict

Destroyed Yugoslav tank.

A leading Serbian expert in the field says the NATO’s use of depleted uranium ammunition in it’s aggression on Serbia has caused enormous increase in cancer rates and number of newborns with genetic malformations.

Silent killer

“Depleted uranium is not only radioactive, it is very toxic as well,” says doctor Radomir Kovacevic, an expert of the Institute for radiology protection “Dr. Dragomir Karajovic” in Belgrade. In an interview for VJ Movement, he explains “Primary it is nephrotoxic, so it affects kidneys, then liver and spleen. Actually, the whole organism is affected from the aspect of toxicity, it is poisoned.”.

Four studies conducted so far, on both civilians and those who worked on the spots’decontamination, have shown that the DU exposure causes typical and specific changes on genetic material.

“DNA molecule is very sensitive on aggression – in this case it is radioactivity. Experimental oncology has shown 18 years ago that in the etiopathogenesis of malignity precedes one genotoxic stadium and that is exactly what is visible on those chromosomes,” tells doctor Kovacevic, stating that the information obtained so far is enough to link the DU contamination to increase in cancer rates.

In Kosovo, none of more than a hundred known DU contaminated locations has been cleaned.
Foreign personnel has been warned to stay clear of those areas unless with full radiological protective clothing.
But no one warned civilians.

Threat to newborn lives

In Vranje area, which is surrounded by four known DU contaminated locations, there has been an enormous increase in cancer rates and number of newborns with genetic malformations. “In 1998, 21 children have been born with deformities. In 2008 there were 73,” says Nela Cvetkovic, a Member of the Vranje City Council, in a statement for VJM. The number of newborn didn’t change, it is about 800-1000 babies per year.

At the same time, in a six year period after the NATO bombing a number of newly registered cancer cases has more than doubled – from 185 in the year 2000 to 398 new diagnosis in 2006.

Permanent consequences

“The half-life of uranium 238 is very long – 4,5 billion years,” reminds nuclear physicist Miroslav Simic, stating that “this way of throwing away the nuclear waste on civil, but also military targets, is not human as the consequences are permanent.”

Traces of uranium 236 and some plutonium isotopes found on bombed locations suggest that at least a part of the material in the projectiles had originated from reprocessing nuclear fuel.

“Plutonium is one million times more toxic than uranium,” says Mr Simic in an interview for VJM, and explains that “one particle of plutonium which would enter a human body is enough to cause fatal consequences”.

“Plutonium is one million times more toxic than uranium,” says Mr Simic in an interview for VJM, and explains that “one particle of plutonium which would enter a human body is enough to cause fatal consequences”.

At the same time in Kosovo, doctor Nebojsa Srbljak, who researches the health consequences of the bombing on civil population, accuses NATO of using so-called dirty bombs. “We first started researching when we found traces of Iodine 131 in the tissue extracted from one patient,” he says, adding that Iodine 131, also known as radio iodine, is well known as a major factor in health consequences of nuclear disaster in Chernobyl.

Price for Kosovo independence

In Kosovo, none of more than a hundred known DU contaminated locations has been cleaned. Foreign personnel has been warned to stay clear of those areas unless with full radiological protective clothing. But no one warned civilians.

“We, the doctors know what it is, politicians are silent to please their mentors. But the people are in the worst position as there are new cancer cases among young persons every day,” says doctor Srbljak, adding that the data on health statistics of Albanian population is completely unavailable.

The global Research

Balkans: Depleted Uraniumin Nato Bombs Remains Today”: Video

Ian Bancroft

Serbia’s boycott of the recent regional summit in Slovenia epitomises the mounting challenges facing regional co-operation in the western Balkans following Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Though Serbia will not be formally asked by the EU to recognise Kosovo, in part because of a lack of consensus over the latter’s status, the accession requirement of “good neighbourly relations” is increasingly being employed to pressure Serbia into at least de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence. With the Kosovo issue set to return to the domestic spotlight in Serbia following the international court of justice’s ruling, pragmatic solutions are urgently required to ensure that regional co-operation avoids further rupture and paralysis.

Serbia has clearly indicated that it does not oppose Kosovo’s participation in regional forums, provided that it is represented by UNMIK officials as “Kosovo-UNMIK”, in accordance with UN security council resolution 1244 which, ultimately, continues to govern the status of the territory. The proposed alternative – “without names of states and only with names of participants” – was rejected by Serbia on the grounds that it would constitute tacit recognition of Kosovo’s independence.

Entitled Together for the European Union: Contribution of the Western Balkans to the European Future, the summit, which was jointly organised by the prime ministers of Slovenia and Croatia, was largely devoid of EU representation, with Herman van Rompuy, the president of the European council, cancelling his participation at the last minute, after Catherine Ashton, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, had earlier rejected an invitation to attend. The EU’s new enlargement commissioner, Stefan Fule, left the summit early, hinting at the EU’s growing scepticism towards further enlargement amid a plethora of regional disputes revolving around issues of sovereignty and territory.

Though Serbia will not be formally asked by the EU to recognise Kosovo, in part because of a lack of consensus over the latter’s status, the accession requirement of “good neighbourly relations” is increasingly being employed to pressure Serbia into at least de facto recognition of Kosovo’s independence

The representation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – which has also not recognised Kosovo, primarily due to the stance of Bosnia’s Serbs – by Nikola Spiric, the chairman of the council of ministers and a member of Milorad Dodik’s Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), meanwhile, was designed to prevent Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak member of the country’s presidency, from tacitly recognising Kosovo’s independence. Accordingly, Spiric left the proceedings once it was the turn of Hashim Thaci, the prime minister of Kosovo, to speak; thereby sending “a clear message to Europe”, in the words of Dodik, the prime minister of Republika Srpska.

Spain, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the EU, is planning to organise a regional summit in Sarajevo this June, which according to Miguel Ángel Moratinos, Spain’s foreign minister, will be “guided by international law” and an “appreciation … [of] all sensitive issues”. Under the guise of good neighbourly relations, however, Serbia is increasingly being pressured to make further concessions with respect to Kosovo. Germany’s ambassador to Serbia, Wolfram Maas, in a statement full of internal contradictions, insisted that “there are no new conditions for Serbia’s further European integration, they are the same as for all other candidates. A request for Kosovo to be recognised as an independent state by Serbia was never made. However, good regional co-operation and good neighbourly relations are a part of the preconditions for membership in the EU. For us, Kosovo is Serbia’s neighbour”. Such views echo those made by Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister, during a recent visit to Belgrade.

For the sake of regional co-operation in, and by extension the European perspective of, the western Balkans, the ICJ's ruling will provide an important chance for Europe to reassert its commitment to negotiated solutions. If the EU fails to grasp this opportunity, it will face a hardening of positions that will further undermine its leverage in the western Balkans.

The Serbian government’s scope for manoeuvre, however, continues to narrow as the issue of Kosovo’s status once again begins to have a notable impact on Serbian domestic politics. Former prime minister and leader of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Vojislav Kostunica, for instance, has repeatedly called on the government to clarify the EU’s stance on Kosovo, emphasising that “the government should not be allowed, without the approval of the parliament, to enter negotiations on new agreements, especially not on implementing good neighbourly relations with Kosovo”. Though largely written off following the last elections, the DSS have reached an agreement on closer co-operation with Serbia’s main opposition parties – New Serbia (NS) and the Serbian Progressive party (SNS) of the former Serbian Radical party member, Tomislav Nikolic. With the SNS regularly polling neck-and-neck with President Tadic’s Democratic party (DS), this agreement could lay the basis for a future coalition government that would certainly pursue a tougher stance on Kosovo.

Two key elements of the EU’s accession criteria – regional co-operation and good neighbourly relations – are increasingly being applied by specific EU member states to exert greater pressure on Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo. The ongoing name dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), however, demonstrates the intractability of such issues in the absence of compromises from both parties. As Slovenia and Croatia have themselves discovered, international law and arbitration provide the best means for securing such compromises, particularly where disputes over territory and sovereignty are concerned. For the sake of regional co-operation in, and by extension the European perspective of, the western Balkans, the ICJ’s ruling will provide an important chance for Europe to reassert its commitment to negotiated solutions. If the EU fails to grasp this opportunity, it will face a hardening of positions that will further undermine its leverage in the western Balkans.

The Guardian

The declaration of independence by the government of Kosovo in February 2008 has given rise to the emergence of a new international group known as the “Quint.”  Interestingly, it comprises all the members of the Contact Group – which apparently has disappeared – with the exception of Russia.  Russia is the only former Contact Group member not to have recognised the independence of Kosovo, and hence its dissenting opinion has meant it can no longer have a place alongside the USA, UK, France, Germany and Italy in a group designed to guide Kosovo through the course of its newly established status.  The result has been the formation of a new group, intentionally excluding Russia, in order that it can work in harmony to assist the independent Kosovo without any objection or obstruction to its work.

The “Quint” has been vocal in recent months in attacking Serbia’s approach towards Kosovo.  Serbia’s argument against the independence of Kosovo has centred around international law and UNSC Resolution 1244.  It claims that unilaterally declared independence violates the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, according to which a new state cannot be formed on the territory of an existing state without the agreement of that state.  As Serbia did not agree to independence, it has deemed the declaration to be illegal.  It would seem that the Quint is running out of patience with Serbia, as it recently released a statement to its Foreign Ministry saying, “We have tolerated until now the Serbian aggressive rhetoric regarding Kosovo, because we believed that with time passing it could be taken off the agenda.”

It would seem that the Quint is running out of patience with Serbia, as it recently released a statement to its Foreign Ministry saying, “We have tolerated until now the Serbian aggressive rhetoric regarding Kosovo, because we believed that with time passing it could be taken off the agenda.”

The interpretation of this is interesting.  On the face of it, it may seem that the Quint countries consider it time to move on for both Kosovo and Serbia, and that repetition of the same argument by Serbia is preventing progress.  Kosovo, now independent, needs to strengthen its economy, become stable and peaceful and tackle organised crime.  It can only really deal with these problems by having a defined status, even if that status has been achieved through a unilateral declaration.  Serbia has aspirations to join the European Union, and must work towards satisfying various criteria in order to make this a reality.  It has been hinted previously that Serbia must accept that Kosovo is now independent if it is move forward in this direction.  Although this makes sense, it is probable that the Quint’s objections to Serbia’s “rhetoric” run deeper.

In December 2009, the International Court of Justice heard evidence from Serbia and other interested parties relating to the legality of Kosovo’s independence.  The hearings were held at Serbia’s request and a decision is expected later this year.  It is hoped by Serbia that the Court will rule in its favour and there can then be a return to negotiations.  Serbia’s success in bringing this legal challenge is perceived as a threat to independence.  Whilst it is unlikely that independence would ever be revoked on this basis, an outcome in favour of Serbia’s position would nevertheless weaken the case.  The Quint, being fearful of this, has consequently asked Serbia to tone its legal argument down.

The Quint has admitted what many of those recognising independence have privately been hoping – that by tolerating this argument, the Serbs would soon realise that nothing will bring Kosovo back, and that instead it would be better to concentrate on gaining entry to the European Union – thus the issue of Kosovo would fall from the political agenda leaving the West free to implement the Ahtisaari plan unimpeded.

In December 2009, the International Court of Justice heard evidence from Serbia and other interested parties relating to the legality of Kosovo’s independence. Serbia’s success in bringing this legal challenge is perceived as a threat to independence. Whilst it is unlikely that independence would ever be revoked on this basis, an outcome in favour of Serbia’s position would nevertheless weaken the case. The Quint, being fearful of this, has consequently asked Serbia to tone its legal argument down.

Then there is the issue of UNSCR 1244, which is being used by both sides to defend their position.  A recent remark by an international official in Kosovo referred to the Serb parallel structures in the north of Kosovo as being in violation of UNSCR 1244.  The official stated that the Resolution does not allow for parallel structures and that any form of violation causes instability.  One can see the logic in this and cannot disagree with the fact that violations could indeed result in instability.  However, the statement is somewhat contradictory because it is obviously acceptable for Kosovo to unilaterally declare itself independent in violation of the resolution, but not acceptable for Serbs to establish parallel structures in the north of Kosovo (where they are a majority) also in violation of the resolution.  Either both sides should be allowed to violate the Resolution in circumstances they consider necessary – in which case it ought to be declared void – or neither side should do it.  Consistency is of the essence here.  Selective application does not work because if one side violates the Resolution, the other will see it as permissible to do so too.

To what extent have both sides actually violated UNSCR 1244?  Whilst there is nothing in the Resolution to support the establishment of parallel Serb structures, there is nothing to specifically prevent it either.  However, because Kosovo is now independent, the parallel structures are seen to undermine its status, thus amounting to a breach of the Resolution, as it was no doubt intended that whatever status Kosovo eventually assumed, it would be respected.  Crucially, as the Resolution does not say what Kosovo’s status should be, there is nothing to prevent Kosovo becoming independent, and independence in itself is not a violation of the Resolution.  However, it is the fact that the independence was unilaterally declared without the agreement of Serbia, which is considered to be a breach of the Resolution.  The creation of Serb parallel structures cannot be considered a violation if the status is illegitimate in the first place.  If both sides had agreed to the independence, the Resolution would have been respected and Serb parallel structures would never have appeared.

This highlights the importance of obtaining a negotiated settlement, which although difficult to achieve, would not be impossible.  Ultimately, the issue is not about whether Kosovo should become independent, but about what can be achieved by both sides.  In other words, obtaining an agreement.  With the right opportunities, unlimited time and freedom from external interference, it would be interesting to see exactly what could be achieved.  Perhaps ironically both would agree to independence, or perhaps something entirely different that no-one has envisaged so far.

Frances Maria Peacock is a British analyst

Gerard Gallucci

I’ve noted the interview given by the Italian Ambassador to Pristina, who also functions as EU envoy to the north. He emphasized a less confrontational approach to the north focusing on improving the daily lives of the people. The Ambassador will reportedly open the Europe House someplace in north Mitrovica on March 26. (Its location seems not entirely clear to the locals but the common suspicion is apparently that it may be co-located with the police.) Finding ways to help the locals in an ethnically divided environment, without running into political issues related to status and the desire of each community to gain or hold their ground, will be a challenge. But the effort is worth making and hopefully he will draw on the expertise and connections of the local UNMIK office to navigate the difficult waters without provoking further conflict (such as over renewed construction in Brdjani).

The question facing the EU in the north is, however, much broader. Although it seems that the EU has decided to leave aside the EUSR’s northern strategy, everything it does in the north potentially raises status issues. This is especially true of EULEX. WAZ quotes an unnamed Brussels source saying that it is not enough for EULEX “to have just a symbolic presence in the north as it was until now. All 27 EU member countries support EULEX and there shouldn’t be difference in the work of EULEX between the north and south banks of the River Ibar.” But there is a difference. As the locals see it, on one side of the River it is independent Kosovo and on the other it remains Serbia.

EULEX officials reportedly have decided to take a higher profile at the two boundary crossings in the north with “checks … to secure the highest level of security and to make sure that materials that could pose threat to security in Kosovo are not brought in at these crossings.” These checks would be carried out by “EULEX, KPS, and customs officials.” Two potential issues here: 1. Whose customs regulations and officials would be used – Kosovo government personnel and law or internationals using UNMIK regulations? 2. Would the personnel sent to the Gates include Kosovo Albanians? Use of Kosovo Customs regulations or officials at the Gates would not be status neutral. And it was the appearance of Kosovo Albanian police at the Gates on February 19, 2008 that was the proximate cause for their being attacked.

The WAZ sources apparently suggested that “several important EU capitals still fear that Serbia is intent on creating problems in Kosovo rather than looking for pragmatic solutions.” But perhaps it is this impatience with Belgrade’s understandable defense of its position on Kosovo, and the resultant wish to somehow force events, that remains the greatest threat to peace and order in Kosovo and to the EU’s own efforts to win hearts and minds.

Any progress on the courts would also require decisions on which law and what court to use. Allowing time for Ambassador Giffoni to try his approach without the complications of further one-sided actions from EULEX might make most sense. This goes as well for how the new construction season is handled in Brdjani.

The WAZ sources apparently suggested that “several important EU capitals still fear that Serbia is intent on creating problems in Kosovo rather than looking for pragmatic solutions.” But perhaps it is this impatience with Belgrade’s understandable defense of its position on Kosovo, and the resultant wish to somehow force events, that remains the greatest threat to peace and order in Kosovo and to the EU’s own efforts to win hearts and minds.

Outside The Walls

In 1991 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was a nominally defensive military bloc with sixteen members that, as the cliche ran, had never fired a shot.

In 1991 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the only simultaneously multiethnic and multiconfessional nation (entirely) in Europe, consisting of six federated republics with diverse constituencies.

By 2009 NATO had grown to 28 full members and at least that many military partners throughout Europe and in Africa, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Asia and the South Pacific. Next month NATO is to hold a summit in Estonia to be attended by the foreign ministers of 56 nations. Last month a meeting of NATO’s Military Committee in Brussels included the armed forces chiefs of 63 nations, almost a third of the world’s 192 countries.

By 2008 the former Yugoslavia has been fragmented into six recognized nations (the former federal republics of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and a semi-recognized province of Serbia, Kosovo.

By 2009 NATO had grown to 28 full members and at least that many military partners throughout Europe and in Africa, the Caucasus, the Middle East, Asia and the South Pacific. Next month NATO is to hold a summit in Estonia to be attended by the foreign ministers of 56 nations. Last month a meeting of NATO’s Military Committee in Brussels included the armed forces chiefs of 63 nations, almost a third of the world’s 192 countries.

By 2008 the former Yugoslavia has been fragmented into six recognized nations (the former federal republics of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) and a semi-recognized province of Serbia, Kosovo.

Until the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, NATO had never staged operations outside the territory of its member states.

In 2004 it ran eight operations in four continents, including a training mission in Iraq and combat deployments in Afghanistan. The first former Yugoslav republic, Slovenia, was inducted into NATO in that year along with six other Eastern European nations in the bloc’s largest-ever expansion.

The Alliance’s first three military operations, however, all occurred in the former Yugoslavia. In 1995 NATO launched Operation Deliberate Force against the Republika Srpska with 400 aircraft and over 3,500 sorties and stationed troops in Bosnia afterward.

In 1999 it unleashed the relentless 78-day Operation Allied Force air war against Yugoslavia and in June of that year deployed 50,000 troops to Kosovo.

Two years later it sent troops to and initiated the first of several operations in Macedonia following an armed conflict in that country.

The three interventions preceded September 11, 2001.

After NATO invoked its Article 5 collective military assistance clause following the latter date, NATO Partnership for Peace affiliates as well as full member states started to deploy troops to Afghanistan.

After the U.S. and British invasion of Iraq two years following that, soldiers from Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia were deployed to the war zone in that nation to prove their loyalty as NATO candidate countries. Montenegro did not gain its Western-backed independence until 2006, but has already been levied for troops for the Afghan war. Croatia was rewarded with full membership in 2009 and Macedonia would have accompanied it into the ranks of the world’s only military axis except for the lingering name dispute with Greece.

In the post-Cold War epoch the former Yugoslavia has been the laboratory for global NATO, its testing ground and battleground, the prototype for the disintegration of nations and for their transformation into economically nonviable monoethnic statelets and Western military colonies.

The NATO military command in charge of the Balkans, Allied Joint Force Command Naples formed in 2004, oversees the eleven-year NATO military operation in Kosovo, Kosovo Force (KFOR), and has a headquarters in Bosnia and in Macedonia and a new military liaison office in Serbia. (Croatia and Slovenia are now full members.)

In December of 2008 the complete transfer of contributing states’ troops from Iraq to Afghanistan began and there are now military personnel from five of the six former Yugoslav republics – Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia – committed to NATO in the world’s longest active and deadliest war theater.

In the post-Cold War epoch the former Yugoslavia has been the laboratory for global NATO, its testing ground and battleground, the prototype for the disintegration of nations and for their transformation into economically nonviable monoethnic statelets and Western military colonies.

The NATO military command in charge of the Balkans, Allied Joint Force Command Naples formed in 2004, oversees the eleven-year NATO military operation in Kosovo, Kosovo Force (KFOR), and has a headquarters in Bosnia and in Macedonia and a new military liaison office in Serbia. (Croatia and Slovenia are now full members.)

In addition to the Adriatic Charter initiative launched by the United States in 2003, which successfully prepared Albania and Croatia for NATO membership and is currently doing the same for Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro with Serbia and Kosovo to follow, the Allied Joint Force Command Naples is the major mechanism for recruiting troops from former Yugoslav republics for wars abroad. Particularly for that in Afghanistan, but the Naples command also operates the NATO Training Mission – Iraq in Baghdad.

Considered by many observers as a major architect of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Richard Holbrooke, now U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, delivered an address in the Persian Gulf state of Qatar last month in which he “drew parallels between the Bosnian war and
the onslaught against the Taliban in Afghanistan,” and said:

“The U.S. has led and won similar wars in Kosovo and Bosnia with the support of the international community. And we are very optimistic about Afghanistan too.” [1]

In the same month the parliament of the Republika Srpska passed a law allowing for a referendum on its current status within Bosnia – two years after the U.S. and almost all its NATO allies supported and recognized the secession of Kosovo from Serbia – and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reacted by stating that the Barack Obama administration does “not want to see any moves to break up Bosnia,” and to insure the integrity of Bosnia (and breakaway Kosovo also) she “reiterated Washington’s support for EU and NATO integration of Western Balkans countries, Serbia included.”

“But the NATO piece of it, I’m watching very closely because…we want Bosnia-Herzegovina to feel like they’re welcome.” [2]

Also in February, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon sounded the same theme while speaking at the Harvard Kennedy School. In a presentation called The Obama
Administration’s Vision for Southeastern Europe, Gordon said “To fully achieve European and therefore American security, we believe that peace and stability should not only extend across northern and central Europe, but also southeastern Europe,” with special emphasis on “Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey.” [3]

Earlier this month former NATO secretary general George Robertson joined the chorus pushing the Alliance’s absorption of the Balkans: “Serbia can offer a lot….I believe it wants to become a part of [the] European mainstream rather than to stay on the margins. All the neighbors of Serbia will be members of the EU and NATO. I am convinced that all the Western Balkan countries will be part of the Alliance in ten years.” [5]

Serbia, by far the most populous of all former Yugoslav states with more than 7 million citizens, is receiving the most attention from NATO at the moment.

In completing the incorporation of all of Southeastern Europe into the U.S.-dominated military bloc, the current American administration would put the capstone on “the historic project of trying to bring democracy to the whole of Europe.”

In particular, “the Obama administration will seek to position Bosnia for future membership in the European Union and NATO,” and in reference to Serbia, “The door to NATO membership is open”.”

According to Harvard’s daily student newspaper, Gordon noted in his speech that “yesterday marked the second anniversary of Kosovo’s independence: a sign that progress has been made.” [4]

Earlier this month former NATO secretary general George Robertson joined the chorus pushing the Alliance’s absorption of the Balkans: “Serbia can offer a lot….I believe it wants to become a part of [the] European mainstream rather than to stay on the margins. All the neighbors of Serbia will be members of the EU and NATO. I am convinced that all the Western Balkan countries will be part of the Alliance in ten years.” [5]

Serbia, by far the most populous of all former Yugoslav states with more than 7 million citizens, is receiving the most attention from NATO at the moment.

Mary Warlick, newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the nation, recently “announced that the door of NATO membership is open to Serbia” and  said “the United States fully supports the European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Serbia and is doing all it can to facilitate Belgrade’s efforts in this direction.” [6]

Her comments were reiterated by NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the U.S.’s Admiral James Stavridis, who in early February visited Serbia’s capital “to establish personal relationships and strengthen cooperation and partnership” and meet with the nation’s president, defense minister and chief of staff of the armed forces. (NATO opened a military liaison office in Belgrade in December of 2006 when Serbia joined the bloc’s Partnership for Peace program.)

Stavridis’ NATO delegation was briefed “on the progress and continued
efforts to professionalize the Serb military” and “participated in the annual National and Armed Forces Day reception.” [7]

Last year the pro-Western government of President Boris Tadic signed an Individual Partnership Program with NATO.

Recently the public affairs chief of the Serbian Ministry of Defense announced that a “Serbian mission [to] NATO will be officially opened by the beginning of June, which is in accordance with participation in the program Partnership for Peace,” and will be staffed by six officers. [8]

On the same day, and to provide a blunt indication of what further NATO integration means, a Serbian news source disclosed that troops from the nation are being readied for peacekeeping deployments in Uganda, Lebanon and a third nation as yet unidentified.

Whereas “the participation of the Serbian Army in international peace operations has until now been limited to sending observers and medical experts,” the country’s armed forces have “organized courses [for] which Serbian experts will be enabled to participate in infantry units and mine clearing units.”

Moreover, military analyst Aleksandar Radic said “NATO and the EU follow the participation of countries in peacekeeping missions very closely. The countries in our region have understood that and started participating in these missions in order to gain a reference for joining international organizations.” [9]

Serbian soldiers are inching ever closer to the Afghan war theater.

Last month the results of a TNS Medium Gallup poll in Serbia showed that “only 20 percent of Serbian citizens would support NATO accession, which is four percent less than last year.”

But not with the support of their countrymen.

Last month the results of a TNS Medium Gallup poll in Serbia showed that “only 20 percent of Serbian citizens would support NATO accession, which is four percent less than last year.” [10]

In tandem with moves to drag Serbia deeper into the NATO nexus despite widespread popular opposition, Brussels and Washington are consolidating their hold on the other three former Yugoslav republics not yet full NATO members: Bosnia, Macedonia and Montenegro.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and a delegation of the permanent representatives of all 28 member states arrived in Bosnia on March 23 to consult with leaders of the nation on a Membership Action Plan, “an essential stepping stone on the road toward alliance membership.”

A senior official in Bosnia’s Foreign Ministry announced that “We expect that Bosnia will be invited to join [the] MAP in Tallinn,” [11] a reference to the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Estonia on April 10.

Earlier this month the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nikola Spiric, visited NATO headquarters in Brussels to meet with Rasmussen and to address the North Atlantic Council.

“NATO Allies thanked Mr. Spiric for the invitation extended to the North Atlantic Council to visit Bosnia and Herzegovina later this month and looked forward to the next meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in April, when the Membership Action Plan for the country will be discussed.” [12]

A week earlier a high-level NATO delegation headed by Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, commander of Allied Joint Force Command Naples, arrived in the Macedonian capital of Skopje to meet with Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, Defense Minister Zoran Konjanovski and chief of the Army General Staff Miroslav Stojanovski and discuss the Army of the Republic of Macedonia’s “contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the achievements of the Republic of Macedonia in the implementation of reforms and the participation in the command structure of the Alliance as well as ARM’s progress in the application of the NATO operation skills concept.”

The delegation also inspected a military base in Krivolak where Fitzgerald and his colleagues were “introduced to the new training capacities and the project of its development into a regional center.” [13]

On February 22nd Boro Vucinic, Montenegro’s defense minister, visited NATO headquarters and met with Deputy Secretary General Claudio Bisogniero. The latter “reaffirmed NATO’s willingness to continue providing relevant assistance and expertise to Montenegrin authorities” and “expressed satisfaction with Montenegro’s decision to become a contributor to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.” [14]

In mid-March Admiral Fitzgerald was in Montenegro and at a press conference expressed his satisfaction at his host nation’s movement toward the North Atlantic bloc, stating “he had witnessed a significant improvement in the past two years,” and said “Montenegro had demonstrated it was a ‘responsible and reliable partner’ in the membership process.”

Speaker of the Parliament of Montenegro Ranko Krivokapic said that NATO membership was a “national priority” and that for the Alliance “it is also strategically important to have this part of the Adriatic coast integrated into the NATO structure.” [15]

On March 22 NATO’s KFOR launched five days of exercises throughout Kosovo in conjunction with the European Union’s EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) and the separatist Kosovo Police Service (KPS).

The drills are headed by NATO commander Markus Bentler.

In an allusion to Kosovo’s ethnic Serb minority that KFOR, EULEX and the KPS are training to subjugate in common, a KFOR statement on the exercises said:

“KFOR will handle its force in Kosovo very flexibly and determinedly. The aim of these operations is to strengthen the capacities of KFOR, EULEX and the Kosovo police so that they could respond to any scenario that brings security into question.” [16]

The putative president of the Republic of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, recently returned from NATO headquarters and a meeting of the bloc’s North Atlantic Council – usually reserved for the ambassadors of full member states – where he had updated those envoys on the “general evolution in Kosovo, Kosovo’s objective [of making] further progress and, especially, its ambition to become a member of NATO.”

In completing the fragmentation of Yugoslavia NATO removed a crucial impediment to its expansion into a global military force. In its place it has acquired seven new members and candidates and as many potential sites for training camps, air and naval bases, and transit points for moving troops and weapons to new war zones on three continents and in the Middle East.

Sedjiu had also “thanked the North Atlantic Council ambassadors for all the support that NATO has [provided] and is providing to Kosovo and has expressed the commitment of our institutions to an active partnership and close cooperation with NATO.”

At a press conference in Pristina after his return, he spoke of his offer to make members of the Kosovo Security Force, a NATO-trained national army in embryo, available for “NATO peacekeeping operations.” [17]

….

In 1991 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and from the following year onward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, presented an obstacle to NATO’s drive to the east – the former Soviet Union and Asia – and to the south – the Middle East and Africa.

In the story of Aesop’s a bundle of sticks tied together could not be broken but, once separated, each could be easily snapped in two.

In completing the fragmentation of Yugoslavia NATO removed a crucial impediment to its expansion into a global military force. In its place it has acquired seven new members and candidates and as many potential sites for training camps, air and naval bases, and transit points for moving troops and weapons to new war zones on three continents and in the Middle East.

1) Tanjug News Agency, February 17, 2010
2) Tanjug News Agency, February 26, 2010
3) Harvard Crimson, February 16, 2010
4) Ibid
5) Tanjug News Agency, March 11, 2010
6) Radio Serbia, February 5, 2010
7) NATO Public Affairs, February 16, 2010
Radio Serbia, March 22, 2010
9) Blic, March 22, 2010
10) Tanjug News Agency, February 11, 2010
11) BalkanInsight, March 23, 2010
12) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 3, 2010
13) Makfax, March 16, 2010
14) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 22, 2010
15) Xinhua News Agency, March 18, 2010
16) Tanjug News Agency, March 22, 2010
17) President of the Republic of Kosovo, March 22, 2010

Australia.to News

Srdja Trifkovic

Inside the Beltway, the fact that Turkey is no longer a U.S. ”ally” in any meaningful sense is still strenuously denied. But as I note on Alternativeright we were reminded of the true score on March 9, when Saudi King Abdullah presented Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan with the Wahhabist kingdom’s most prestigious prize for his “services to Islam.” Erdogan earned the King Faisal Prize for having “rendered outstanding service to Islam by defending the causes of the Islamic nation.”

Services to the Ummah – Turkey under Erdogan’s neo-Islamist AKP has rendered a host of other services to “the Islamic nation.” In August 2008 Ankara welcomed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for a formal state visit, and last year it announced that it would not join any sanctions aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In the same spirit the AKP government repeatedly played host to Sudan’s President Omer Hassan al-Bashir — a nasty piece of jihadist work if there ever was one — who stands accused of genocide against non-Muslims. Erdogan has barred Israel from annual military exercises on Turkey’s soil, but his government signed a military pact with Syria last October and has been conducting joint military exercises with the regime of Bashir al-Assad. Turkey’s strident apologia of Hamas is more vehement than anything coming out of Cairo or Amman. (Talking of terrorists, Erdogan has stated, repeatedly, “I do not want to see the word ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamist’ in connection with the word ‘terrorism’!”) imultaneous pressure to conform to Islam at home has gathered pace over the past seven years, and is now relentless. Turkish businessmen will tell you privately that sipping a glass of raki in public may hurt their chances of landing government contracts; but it helps if their wives and daughters wear the hijab.

Ankara’s continuing bid to join the European Union is running parallel with its openly neo-Ottoman policy of re-establishing an autonomous sphere of influence in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Turkey’s EU candidacy is still on the agenda, but the character of the issue has evolved since Erdogan’s AKP came to power in 2002.

When the government in Ankara started the process by signing an Association agreement with the EEC (as it was then) in 1963, its goal was to make Turkey more “European.” This had been the objective of subsequent attempts at Euro-integration by other neo-Kemalist governments prior to Erdogan’s election victory eight years ago, notably those of Turgut Ozal and Tansu Ciller in the 1990s. The secularists hoped to present Turkey’s “European vocation” as an attractive domestic alternative to the growing influence of political Islam, and at the same time to use the threat of Islamism as a means of obtaining political and economic concessions and specific timetables from Brussels. Erdogan and his personal friend and political ally Abdullah Gul, Turkey’s president, still want the membership, but their motives are vastly different. Far from seeking to make Turkey more European, they want to make Europe more Turkish — many German cities are well on the way — and more Islamic, thus reversing the setback of 1683 without firing a shot.

Ankara’s continuing bid to join the European Union is running parallel with its openly neo-Ottoman policy of re-establishing an autonomous sphere of influence in the Balkans and in the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Turkey’s EU candidacy is still on the agenda, but the character of the issue has evolved since Erdogan’s AKP came to power in 2002.

The neo-Ottoman strategy was clearly indicated by the appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu as foreign minister almost a year ago. As Erdogan’s long-term foreign policy advisor, he advocated diversifying Turkey’s geopolitical options by creating exclusively Turkish zones of influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East… including links with Khaled al-Mashal of Hamas. On the day of his appointment in May Davutoglu asserted that Turkey’s influence in “its region” will continue to grow: Turkey had an “order-instituting role” in the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus, he declared, quite apart from its links with the West. In his words, Turkish foreign policy has evolved from being “crisis-oriented” to being based on “vision”: “Turkey is no longer a country which only reacts to crises, but notices the crises before their emergence and intervenes in the crises effectively, and gives shape to the order of its surrounding region.” He openly asserted that Turkey had a “responsibility to help stability towards the countries and peoples of the regions which once had links with Turkey” — thus explicitly referring to the Ottoman era, in a manner unimaginable only a decade ago: “Beyond representing the 70 million people of Turkey, we have a historic debt to those lands where there are Turks or which was related to our land in the past. We have to repay this debt in the best way.”

This strategy is based on the assumption that growing Turkish clout in the old Ottoman lands — a region in which the EU has vital energy and political interests — may prompt President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel to drop their objections to Turkey’s EU membership. If on the other hand the EU insists on Turkey’s fulfillment of all 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire — which Turkey cannot and does not want to complete — then its huge autonomous sphere of influence in the old Ottoman domain can be developed into a major and potentially hostile counter-bloc to Brussels. Obama approved this strategy when he visited Ankara in April of last year, shortly after that notorious address to the Muslim world in Cairo.

Erdogan is no longer eager to minimize or deny his Islamic roots, but his old assurances to the contrary – long belied by his actions — are still being recycled in Washington, and treated as reality. This reflects the propensity of this ddministration, just like its predecessors, to cherish illusions about the nature and ambitions of our regional “allies,” such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

The implicit assumption in Washington — that Turkey would remain “secular” and “pro-Western,” come what may — should have been reassessed already after the Army intervened to remove the previous pro-Islamic government in 1997. Since then the Army has been neutered, confirming the top brass old warning that “democratization” would mean Islamization. Dozens of generals and other senior ranks — traditionally the guardians of Ataturk’s legacy — are being called one by one for questioning in a government-instigated political trial. To the dismay of its small Westernized secular elite, Turkey has reasserted its Asian and Muslim character with a vengeance.

Washington’s stubborn denial of Turkey’s political, cultural and social reality goes hand in hand with an ongoing Western attempt to rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire, and to present it as almost a precursor of Europe’s contemporary multiethnic, multicultural tolerance, diversity, etc, etc. In reality, four salient features of the Ottoman state were institutionalized discrimination against non-Muslims, total personal insecurity of all its subjects, an unfriendly coexistence of its many races and creeds, and the absence of unifying state ideology.

Neo-Ottomanism – Washington’s stubborn denial of Turkey’s political, cultural and social reality goes hand in hand with an ongoing Western attempt to rehabilitate the Ottoman Empire, and to present it as almost a precursor of Europe’s contemporary multiethnic, multicultural tolerance, diversity, etc, etc. In reality, four salient features of the Ottoman state were institutionalized discrimination against non-Muslims, total personal insecurity of all its subjects, an unfriendly coexistence of its many races and creeds, and the absence of unifying state ideology. It was a sordid Hobbesian borderland with mosques. An “Ottoman culture,” defined by Constantinople and largely limited to its walls, did eventually emerge through the reluctant mixing of Turkish, Greek, Slavic, Jewish and other Levantine lifestyles and practices, each at its worst. The mix was impermanent, unattractive, and unable to forge identities or to command loyalties.

The Roman Empire could survive a string of cruel, inept or insane emperors because its bureaucratic and military machines were well developed and capable of functioning even when there was confusion at the core. The Ottoman state lacked such mechanisms. Devoid of administrative flair, the Turks used the services of educated Greeks and Jews and awarded them certain privileges. Their safety and long-term status were nevertheless not guaranteed, as witnessed by the hanging of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch on Easter Day 1822.

The Ottoman Empire gave up the ghost right after World War I, but long before that it had little interesting to say, or do, at least measured against the enormous cultural melting pot it had inherited and the splendid opportunities of sitting between the East and West. Not even a prime location at the crossroads of the world could prompt creativity. The degeneracy of the ruling class, blended with Islam’s inherent tendency to the closing of the mind, proved insurmountable. A century later the Turkish Republic is a populous, self-assertive nation-state of over 70 million. Ataturk hoped to impose a strictly secular concept of nationhood, but political Islam has reasserted itself. In any event the Kemalist dream of secularism had never penetrated beyond the military and a narrow stratum of the urban elite.

The near-impossible task facing Turkey’s Westernized intelligentsia before Erdogan had been to break away from the lure of irredentism abroad, and at home to reform Islam into a matter of personal choice separated from the State and distinct from the society. Now we know that it could not be done. The Kemalist edifice, uneasily perched atop the simmering Islamic volcano, is by now an empty shell.

A new “Turkish” policy is long overdue in Washington. Turkey is not an “indispensable ally,” as Paul Wolfowitz called her shortly before the war in Iraq, and as Obama repeated last April. It is no longer an ally at all. It may have been an ally in the darkest Cold War days, when it accommodated U.S. missiles aimed at Russia’s heartland. Today it is just another Islamic country, a regional power of considerable importance to be sure, with interests and aspirations that no longer coincide with those of the United States.

Both Turkey and the rest of the Middle East matter far less to American interests than we are led to believe, and it is high time to demythologize America’s special relationships throughout the region. Accepting that Mustafa Kemal’s legacy is undone is the long-overdue first step.

The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies

Turkey is not an "indispensable ally," as Paul Wolfowitz called her shortly before the war in Iraq, and as Obama repeated last April. It is no longer an ally at all. It may have been an ally in the darkest Cold War days, when it accommodated U.S. missiles aimed at Russia's heartland. Today it is just another Islamic country, a regional power of considerable importance to be sure, with interests and aspirations that no longer coincide with those of the United States.

March 17 marked the sixth anniversary of a concerted assault against Serbs and other ethnic minorities in Kosovo that resulted in 800 Serbian homes and thirty five Orthodox churches and monasteries being destroyed, 4,000 Serbs and Roma (Gypsies) forced to flee their homes, 900 hundred people injured and 19 killed.

On the first day of the attacks, which started in the ethnically-divided city of Kosovska Mitrovica but soon spread to several other locales, personnel of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) abandoned offices in the cities of Gnjilane, Prizren and Pec and one UN representative, alluding to the anti-Jewish rampage in Nazi Germany in 1938, said “Kristallnacht is under way in Kosovo. What is happening in Kosovo must unfortunately be described as a pogrom against Serbs: churches are on fire and people are being attacked for no other reason than their ethnic background.”

The attacks followed the accidental drowning of three ethnic Albanian youth which local separatist politicians and media attributed to the actions of Serbs and used to incite an orgy of intolerance, ethnic hostility and violence.

They marked the worst, and deadliest, violence in the Balkans since NATO’s 78-day bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the war in Macedonia two years later launched by an offshoot of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) operating out of NATO-occupied Kosovo. Clashes occurred between ethnic Albanians and Serbs and between both and NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops. The dead and wounded included members of all three groups.

On the first day of the attacks, which started in the ethnically-divided city of Kosovska Mitrovica but soon spread to several other locales, personnel of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) abandoned offices in the cities of Gnjilane, Prizren and Pec and one UN representative, alluding to the anti-Jewish rampage in Nazi Germany in 1938, said “Kristallnacht is under way in Kosovo. What is happening in Kosovo must unfortunately be described as a pogrom against Serbs: churches are on fire and people are being attacked for no other reason than their ethnic background.” [1]

The United Nations ombudsman at the time, Poland’s Marek Nowicki, issued a similar warning, saying “there exists the intent to cleanse this land of the presence of all Serbs.” [2]

The government of Serbia, and Kosovo was still legally recognized as its province by every nation in the world except Albania, also characterized the attacks as designed to perpetrate ethnic cleansing. But NATO, in charge of KFOR and as such the Serbian sites that were destroyed, did not.

Four years later Albanian separatist leaders declared the province’s unilateral independence on February 17. Despite a historically unprecedented campaign by the U.S. and its NATO allies to gain international recognition for “the first NATO state in the world” as Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica described the illegal entity shortly following its secession [3], after over two years and a combination of heavy-handed pressure and handsome bribery from the West only 65 of the world’s 192 nations accord the breakaway entity diplomatic recognition.

Those who do not include the BRIC nations – Brazil, China, India and Russia – and the overwhelming majority of countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Those who do include the United States and all other NAT0 members except for Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain which have their own reasons for fearing the Kosovo precedent, and small (and very small) states particularly susceptible to economic incentives like Belize, the Comoros, Liechtenstein, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, and San Marino.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia devolved into the Western-engineered State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, which in turn split into its two parts in 2006. This created waters muddy enough for advocates of Kosovo separatism to fish in, but the fact remains that Kosovo was a province of Serbia during the eleven years of the Federal Republic mentioned in UN Resolution 1244. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was coterminous with and the successor state to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In early January the commander of NATO’s Joint Forces Command Naples, U.S. Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, was in Kosovo and met with German KFOR
Commander Markus Bentler, afterwards claiming that self-governing Serbian enclaves, surrounded and besieged by Kosovo separatists, “represent a threat to Kosovo stability,” and emphasizing “KFOR’s readiness to answer any threat.”

More specifically, Fitzgerald said that “All violations of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 pose a threat to security. Since the resolution does not approve of parallel institutions, they are cause for concern.”

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted on June 10, 1999 and placed Kosovo under interim UN administration.

As for ethnic Serbs violating the terms or even the spirit of the resolution by refusing to surrender to an illegal secessionist regime not recognized by almost two-thirds of United Nations members, UN Resolution 1244 “Reaffirm[s] the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act….”

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia devolved into the Western-engineered State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, which in turn split into its two parts in 2006. This created waters muddy enough for advocates of Kosovo separatism to fish in, but the fact remains that Kosovo was a province of Serbia during the eleven years of the Federal Republic mentioned in UN Resolution 1244. The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro was coterminous with and the successor state to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro of February 4, 2003 states:

“Should Montenegro break away from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, the international instruments pertaining to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly UN SC Resolution 1244, would concern and apply in their entirety to Serbia as the successor.”

Serbs in Kosovo don’t desire to leave Kosovo but to remain in Serbia. Residents of the U.S. state of West Virginia can appreciate the distinction.

By an ostensible “threat to security” the NATO commander meant the unwillingness of Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities to vote in elections held by and entrust their fragile security to a renegade political anomaly with an ethnically exclusionary agenda and extensive, in fact inextricable, links to Europe’s largest criminal underworld. (To wit, trafficking in narcotics, weapons, sex slaves, passports and, if accounts in the recent memoirs of former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Carla Del Ponte are to be credited, organs extracted from murdered victims.)

That is, refusing to submit to the West’s carefully groomed client state and the first NATO pseudo-nation. As with the Georgia of Mikheil Saakashvili, all the West’s much-celebrated “Euro-Atlantic” rhetoric about diversity, pluralism, rule of law, transparency, human rights and democratic values is exposed for the hollow, self-serving lie it is.

After 50,000 NATO troops poured into Kosovo in 1999, bringing with them their allies from the Kosovo Liberation Army which they had trained and armed in camps in Albania, hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Roma and other minorities fled the province. 200,000 Serbs alone remain in exile almost eleven years later.

Roma sources have estimated that a comparable amount of Roma and related Askalis and Egyptians have been terrorized into fleeing their homes and relocating elsewhere in Kosovo, other parts of Serbia, Macedonia and further abroad.

UN Resolution 1244, which of late NATO and U.S. officials have taken to evoking (as the Devil quotes Scripture) also “Reaffirm[s] the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety.”

After 50,000 NATO troops poured into Kosovo in 1999, bringing with them their allies from the Kosovo Liberation Army which they had trained and armed in camps in Albania, hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Roma and other minorities fled the province. 200,000 Serbs alone remain in exile almost eleven years later.

Before NATO’s entry and the KLA’s return in June of 1999, Kosovo was one of the most ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse spots on the earth. Its two million citizens consisted of Muslims, Christians and Jews, including (to defy stereotypes) Muslim Slavs and Christian Albanians. Its inhabitants were Albanian, Serbian, Askali, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Egyptian, Gorani, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma and Turkish.

If the province was diverse, the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army wasn’t. It was monoethnic. Fiercely so. It sought an exclusively Albanian Kosovo and after that Greater Albania.

The West is near to providing it with the first and is assisting its former members – ex-KLA chief Hashim Thaci is now recognized by the West as Kosovo’s prime minister – to achieve the second.

In the late 1990s no one but ethnic Albanian separatist extremists, by no means all Albanians, felt constrained to wage unprovoked armed attacks against security and civilian targets in the province.

The fate of the smaller ethnic communities, those neither Albanian nor Serbian, since June of 1999 gives the definitive lie to eleven years of Western propaganda about Kosovo. Roma, Gorans, Turks and others have been murdered, driven in fear from their homes and forced to flee the province.

Paul Polansky, head of the Kosovo Roma Refugee Fund, wrote in 2008 (two days before Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence) that “Before NATO troops arrived, there were about 17,500 Gypsy homes with a population of about 120,000. By the time I did my survey [in 2007] more than 14,500 homes had been destroyed by Albanians and only about 30,000 Gypsies were still in Kosovo.”

He added:

“I witnessed many Albanians chasing out Gypsy families and then looting their homes before burning them down. This happened in front of NATO troops.”

“Fearing independence, all minorities are still leaving Kosovo….After eight years of UN administration, there is still no freedom of movement for minorities outside their own villages.”

“The German government acknowledges that there are more than 35,000 Kosovo Gypsies living today in Germany. Germany hopes to deport them when Kosovo has independence….” [4]

He further detailed that remaining Roma have been living in camps on or near toxic dumps (an abandoned mining and smelting complex with a slag heap
containing 100 million tons of poisonous materials) and suffering from epidemic rates of cancer and brain damage.

Polansky used the word appropriate to what is occurring: Genocide.

Last October, twenty months after separatist leaders announced Kosovo’s independence, Germany formalized plans to forcibly deport 14,000 Kosovo refugees including 12,000 Roma. A member of parliament of the opposition Left Party warned that the expulsion would put them in danger, as “Kosovo is a country in which minorities are deeply discriminated against and persecuted.” [5]

There are an estimated 20,000 internally displaced persons in Kosovo living in dangerous and squalid conditions. A United Nations report estimates that 20 per cent of Roma remaining in Kosovo are stateless.

Albanians have not fared much better. A feature in Germany’s Der Spiegel in 2002 revealed that “After the war the cruelest cleansings took place
among the Albanians. Under the pretext that they were ‘Serbian collaborators’, the leaders of the KLA liquidated their political opponents; old blood feuds were settled, and Albanian civilians were executed by the Albanians themselves.”

“The number of the victims is estimated to be more than a thousand. The perpetrators or instigators were usually former senior KLA leaders; after the war they were integrated nearly without exception into the KLA successor organization, the civilian Kosovo Protection Corps.” [6]

A report by the Reuters news agency last November documented that if non-Albanians fear for their lives in Kosovo, even ethnic Albanians were condemned to a plight that can barely be qualified as living.

Eleven years and an estimated three million euros (over $4 million) in aid later, the official unemployment rate is between 40-50 per cent and the average per capita income is 1,760 euros, “less than 93 cents a day, according to the World Bank.”

“That compares with average joblessness of just under 10 percent in the European Union and an average salary of about 24,000 euros ($35,930).” [7]

Before NATO’s entry and the KLA’s return in June of 1999, Kosovo was one of the most ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse spots on the earth. Its two million citizens consisted of Muslims, Christians and Jews, including (to defy stereotypes) Muslim Slavs and Christian Albanians. Its inhabitants were Albanian, Serbian, Askali, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Egyptian, Gorani, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Roma and Turkish.
If the province was diverse, the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army wasn’t. It was monoethnic. Fiercely so. It sought an exclusively Albanian Kosovo and after that Greater Albania.

Kosovo is the showcase for the West’s self-styled humanitarian intervention and post-Cold War “nation building.” The prototype for Afghanistan, Iraq and much of the rest of the world.

With the perversion – the inversion – of the intent of UN Resolution 1244, the U.S. and its NATO allies are well on their way to insuring a monoethnic Kosovo with a NATO standard army.

In late January of this year U.S. ambassador to Kosovo Christopher Dell “said that Serbia’s efforts to once again impose its legal system on Kosovo are a clear violation of the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1244.”

He further stated:

“What has been forgotten over the last ten years is that Resolution 1244
clearly takes the power over Kosovo away from Serbia, and Belgrade’s effort to impose a legislative system in Kosovo is an open violation of the resolution….This resolution recognizes Kosovo’s territorial integrity and the fact that there is only one legal system in Kosovo. All countries that do not recognize Kosovo still recognize the validity of Resolution 1244.” [8]

Again, the resolution unequivocally confirms “the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act….”

Which is how Russia still views the mandate of UN Resolution 1244. Two days after the American envoy’s egregious comments, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Andrei Nesterenko said that the current Western – U.S., NATO and European Union – plans for forcibly subjugating northern Kosovo and its Serb minority “violates Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council.”

“By this I refer to the so-called strategy for northern Kosovo, which
violates UN SC Resolution 1244 and generates tensions in the province.”

He also said that Russia “insists on the UN mission in Kosovo,
UNMIK, fulfilling its obligations in representing Kosovo in regional and
international institutions.” [9]

However, U.S. Ambassador Dell, in indicating that Western intentions toward surviving Serbian enclaves are not peaceful, referred to their autonomous governing bodies as “criminal parallel structures” and added “criminal structures organized in the north are completely linked with the so-called parallel governmental structures.” [10] To exclusively single out Serbian communities in a Kosovo that is the most crime-ridden part of Europe is a tour de force of arrogance, underhandedness and Goebbelsesque distortion of the truth.

Serb and other threatened minority communities are to be subordinated to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which will transition them to the control of the Kosovo regime of former KLA chief Hashim Thaci.

The fate of the smaller ethnic communities, those neither Albanian nor Serbian, since June of 1999 gives the definitive lie to eleven years of Western propaganda about Kosovo. Roma, Gorans, Turks and others have been murdered, driven in fear from their homes and forced to flee the province

In late January Pieter Feith, the European Union Special Representative in Kosovo, disclosed that “EULEX personnel will be moving into northern Kosovo soon.”

“Feith’s strategy for northern Kosovo calls for the support of the
‘international community’ in direct links between Serbia’s European
perspective and the decrease of Belgrade’s support for the ‘parallel’
structures in the north of Kosovo.

“The strategy was created by Feith and the temporary institutions in Pristina, and it is part of the decentralization process in Kosovo, with the goal of taking over control in the northern [Serbian] part of Kosovska Mitrovica.” [11]

In the same week Feith visited NATO headquarters in Brussels with EULEX chief Yves de Kermabon to “take part in an informal meeting with the NATO
Council and…focus on cooperation between the EU and NATO in the field, and the situation in the north of Kosovo.

“The visit comes after the meeting of the NATO military leadership, who discussed Kosovo.” [12]

(Starting in December of 2007 the European Union worked in tandem with Washington to unleash an independent Kosovo on Europe and the world and to supplant the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo with the European Union Rule of Law – EULEX – Mission as the transitional mechanism for turning the province fully over to the new Republic of Kosovo. The EU nations that led the drive to recognize Kosovo’s secession were Britain, France, Germany and Italy, the same four countries that met in Munich 70 years earlier to cede the Sudetenland and then all of Czechoslovakia to Nazi Germany.)

Russian political analyst Pyotr Iskenderov wrote a few days afterward that “the plan for a final solution for North Kosovo is similar to the one Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had in mind launching an attack against South Ossetia in August, 2008. Even the stated objectives – the restoration of the constitutional jurisdiction in Saakashvili’s wording – is the same in both cases.

“The contours of the Kosovo separatists’ plan to suppress the Serbian resistance in the northern part of the province with the help of the US and the EU are becoming increasingly visible.” [13]

After KFOR and EULEX secure domination over Serb communities, they will be transferred to the rulers in Pristina and their NATO-created army.

The month after Thaci and his colleagues declared independence with the assistance of the major NATO nations, KFOR and the revamped KLA that was the Kosovo Protection Corps began the conversion of the latter into the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). It was officially inaugurated in January of 2009.

Described by Western powers as an “unarmed disaster-relief organization,” it was recently identified by a German news agency more accurately as “Kosovo’s fledgling army, mainly manned by former guerrillas….” [14]

Last year it was announced that the Pentagon would supply it with uniforms, Britain with training – in the words of the Defence Ministry to NATO standards and according to London’s ambassador to Kosovo to prepare the state for NATO membership – and Germany with 200 vehicles.

Last September NATO held maneuvers with the Kosovo Security Force, Exercise Agile Lion, and pronounced that the KSF had achieved Initial Operational Capability. “The next goal for the KSF is to reach Full Operational Capability.” [15]

UN Resolution 1244 also explicitly calls for “Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups….”

NATO has instead rearmed them and is in the process of institutionalizing the former KLA as a national army.

The last time foreign powers militarily occupied Kosovo was in the early 1940s. They were Benito Mussolini’s Italy and Adolf Hitler’s Germany. The last time an Albanian military formation was created by an occupying power was in 1944 when Heinrich Himmler set up the Skanderbeg SS Division.

January of 2009 brought the official launching of the KSF “overseen by Nato.” [16]

Within days of assuming the post of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James Stavridis affirmed that “We are interested in having modern equipment and advanced training for KSF, and I will try in my capability to assist widely during my three-year mandate.” [17]

On March 15 a NATO website disclosed:

“Since achieving Initial Operational Capability in September 2009, the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) has continued to develop its skills and capabilities in core areas, with the assistance of NATO forces in Kosovo….NATO nations decided to support this task with a Donation Programme established In June 2008. The value of all the equipment and infrastructure projects required by the KSF to be fully capable is 37.4 million euros. [18]

On March 7 the Kosovo Security Force, erstwhile “unarmed disaster-relief organization,” brandished arms at what was described as a Kosovo Liberation Army memorial service to mark the twelve anniversary of the latter’s rebellion against the government of Yugoslavia and the death of its commander at the time, Adem Jashari. An “armed honor guard” also displayed the NATO flag during the parade.

KFOR commander General Markus Bentler pretended to be offended at what, after all, is only the KLA renamed and with new insignia reverting to form, and even mentioned suspending NATO’s training of the 2,500-man force the day of the armed march.

The nominal president of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, responded by stating “KFOR is an important investor in the enlargement of KSF and…all the steps thus far were undertaken in agreement and partnership and I believe that in the future (it) will contribute to our NATO membership.” Hashim Thaci’s deputy Hajredin Kuci added the assertion that “nobody should expect Kosovo not to behave like a sovereign state.” [19]

However, the bond between the North Atlantic military bloc and its KLA allies is an old and unbreakable one, and the next day relations between the NATO Kosovo Force and its Kosovo Security Force subordinates were restored and “a new agreement was reached by which the KSF ceremonial unit could carry weapons in a manner agreed upon in advance.” [20]

Russian analyst Pyotr Iskenderov, cited earlier, wrote that “The statements emanating from Pristina and the intensifying international debates over the Kosovo theme do not only show that the Albanian separatists are preparing an attack against their opponents but also give an idea of its potential scenario, the distribution of roles in it, and the extent to which Hashim Thaci and other former leaders of the terrorist Kosovo Liberation Army are relying on international support in the process.” [21]

From January 15-24 of this year NATO’s KFOR conducted military exercises throughout Kosovo. The stated purpose of the maneuvers was to “enable KFOR forces to maintain a high degree of readiness and be prepared to quickly deploy in response to any scenario.” [22]

Kosovo is the showcase for the West’s self-styled humanitarian intervention and post-Cold War “nation building.” The prototype for Afghanistan, Iraq and much of the rest of the world.

Afterward a Serbian news agency reported on a KFOR press release which stated “the exercises were conducted so as to check the full operational capability of multinational combat groups after the structural changes in the international military forces have taken place.

“More than 5,000 soldiers from 31 countries, 700 tactical vehicles on land, and 21 helicopters for air support, were included in this military simulation of real-life battle conditions….[T]he exercises confirmed that the multinational battle groups are ‘fast, very flexible, mobile, and ready to deploy in response to any situation which might endanger security on the whole territory of Kosovo.’”

“KFOR said there will be further exercises so that the groups could be trained and their operational capability preserved at the highest possible level.” [23]

Toward the end of last month the U.S. deployed two companies of soldiers based in Camp Bondsteel, the largest overseas military installation the Pentagon has constructed since the Vietnam War, to the north of Kosovo.

“The KFOR command in Pristina has announced that their deployment will confirm operational ability to reinforce and support any combat group in Kosovo.”

The U.S. exercises in February and the KFOR ones the previous month occurred against the backdrop of the threats by NATO commander Admiral Mark Fitzgerald and U.S. ambassador to Serbia Christopher Dell examined earlier and are part of “an ICO [International Civilian Office - European Union Special Representative]/Kosovo Albanian government strategy to ‘integrate’ this [northern Kosovo], predominantly Serb area of the province, and bring it under Pristina’s control.

“Serbs in the north, however, are refusing any kind of connection to the Kosovo institutions. Pristina’s intent is to start shutting down local governments supported by Belgrade.” [24]

In conjunction with coordinated moves against Serbian communities in the north of Kosovo by KFOR, EULEX, the Kosovo regime of Thaci and Sejdiu and its new army in formation, attacks against Serb civilians have also intensified in an effort to drive them out of the province.

Three firebombs were hurled at the home of a Serb family in northern Kosovoska Mitrovica last month and the house of an elderly Serb couple in Klina was stoned at the same time.

On February 18 in Gnjilane, in eastern Kosovo, the grave of a Serbian woman buried earlier in the day was dug up and robbed. A local Serb official remarked of this desecration: “The deceased’s last wish was to be buried in the upper part of the Gnjilane cemetery. This was the first burial in this cemetery since 1999. The digging up of her grave is a clear message to Serbs that they cannot even bury their dead in Gnjilane.” [25]

Two days later a Serbian male was assaulted in Istok, in northwestern Kosovo, by a gang of Albanians and afterward taken to a hospital in Kosovska Mitrovica. The coordinator for returning Serbs in the city said “that the situation in Istok has drastically worsened over the last week, and that the attack has further upset Serbs living in the municipality.”

“There are five homes almost complete for returning Serbs…and it is
obvious that someone does not like it,” Vesna Malikovic added. [26]

Almost eleven years ago the U.S. and NATO brought their KLA allies to power in Kosovo. There was no way they could have achieved that objective on their own.

To demonstrate to whom the likes of Hashim Thaci, Ramush Haradinaj, Agim Ceku and other former Kosovo Liberation Army leaders see themselves indebted to for the opportunity of purging the province of all non-Albanian inhabitants – and eliminating Albanians not deemed sufficiently subservient – they have named the main street in the capital of Pristina after George W. Bush, who engineered Kosovo’s formal secession two years ago.

Major streets in the capital are also named after Tony Blair, Madeleine Albright and William Walker, and last November 1 Bill Clinton arrived in Pristina to join Hashim Thaci in unveiling a grotesque eleven-foot statue to the former American president.

While promoting NATO’s new Strategic Concept with her 12-member Group of Experts last month, Madeleine Albright said that “If you wish to know what I think is the most important thing I accomplished as U.S. secretary of state, I think it is the stopping of the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,” though local media reported she initially used the phrase “conducting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.”

While promoting NATO’s new Strategic Concept with her 12-member Group of Experts last month, Madeleine Albright said that “If you wish to know what I think is the most important thing I accomplished as U.S. secretary of state, I think it is the stopping of the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,” though local media reported she initially used the phrase “conducting the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.” [27]

There was no need for her to correct herself. She stated the matter accurately the first time.

1) B92, March 17, 2004
2) Ombudsman office, Pristina, Kosovo, Statement to the Media, 18 March 2004
3) Serbian Government, April 26, 2008
4) The Statesman (India), February 15, 2008
5) Reuters, October 14, 2009
6) Der Spiegel, September 21, 2002 (In German)
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-25211840.html
7) Reuters, November 20, 2009
Beta News Agency, January 27, 2010
9) B92/FoNet/Tanjug News Agency, January 29, 2010
10) Beta News Agency, January 27, 2010
11) Tanjug News Agency, January 30, 2010
12) B92/FoNet/Tanjug News Agency, January 29, 2010
13) Strategic Culture Foundation, February 3, 2010
14) Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 8, 2010
15) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Kosovo Force, September 16, 2009
16) BBC News, January 21, 2010
17) Kosovo Times, July 30, 2009
18) North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Command Operations
March 15, 2010
19) B92, March 7, 2010
20) Southeast European Times, March 11, 2010
21) Strategic Culture Foundation, February 3, 2010
22) Radio Serbia, January 13, 2010
23) Tanjug News Agency, February 6, 2010
24) B92, February 22, 2010
25) Beta News Agency, February 19, 2010
26) FoNet, February 20, 2010
27) Tanjug News Agency, February 11, 2010

Australia.to News

Ian Bancroft

Three coinciding events – Radovan Karadzic’s opening statement before the international tribunal, the arrest of Ejup Ganic in London and Bernard Kouchner’s mocking remarks to a journalist’s question regarding human organ trafficking allegations in Kosovo – have once again illustrated the persistent tensions between the need to recognise all crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and perceptions of crimes being relativised, on the other.

Neither theory nor practice provides a clear-cut solution for overcoming such dilemmas, but conflict transformation requires that the collectivisation of guilt be diluted in order to vanquish inter-ethnic paralysis and prevent individual victims from being denied justice purely because of their ethno-national identity.

Ganic, a war-time member of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was arrested on an extradition warrant from Serbia for alleged war crimes relating to the murder of 42 soldiers during an attack on a UN-led convoy containing a Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) column withdrawing from Sarajevo. Ganic’s detention has sparked a furious response from various quarters.

Neither theory nor practice provides a clear-cut solution for overcoming such dilemmas, but conflict transformation requires that the collectivisation of guilt be diluted in order to vanquish inter-ethnic paralysis and prevent individual victims from being denied justice purely because of their ethno-national identity.

Haris Silajdzic, the Bosniak member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, was quick to remark that “this is not the first attempt to relativise and set equal blame”, while Christian Schwarz-Schilling, a former high representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, described the move as “an attempt to manipulate history … [that] also reflects Serbia’s continuous attempt to avert the blame for atrocities committed during the war and allocate some of the responsibility to other former Yugoslav republics”.

Such statements essentially argue that to seek recognition for crimes committed against one party to the conflict in some way serves to relativise those crimes perpetuated by that very same party. The commonly employed dichotomies of war – of “defenders” versus “aggressors”, of forces of “good” versus those of “evil” – are, however, always far too simplistic to capture and comprehend the inherent complexities, particularly of a civil war such as that fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The commonly employed dichotomies of war – of “defenders” versus “aggressors”, of forces of “good” versus those of “evil” – are, however, always far too simplistic to capture and comprehend the inherent complexities, particularly of a civil war such as that fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Overcoming these dichotomies requires that individual crimes and individual victims be recognised regardless of their ethno-national identity. The failure to do so only serves to reinforce the collectivisation of guilt and the perpetuation of divisions on ethnic lines. The potential costs of “dragging up the past” by no means outweigh the benefits to post-conflict societies of compelling all parties to explore their respective historical roles and responsibilities – not only during the early 1990s, but deeper into the past – in order to challenge the forces of historical revisionism.

The same point also applies to members of the international community, whose involvement in the Balkans has not been without consequence. During a recent visit to the Serb enclave of Gracanica, Bernard Kouchner, the French foreign minister and former head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, responded to a question about human organ trafficking – allegations that first surfaced in a book by Carla Del Ponte, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’s former chief prosecutor, and which are currently being investigated by the Council of Europe – with a heated diatribe, insisting that “there was no yellow house, there was no organ trade. People who talk about things like that are bums and murderers”.

Kouchner's crass remarks are those of a man who believes himself to be simultaneously judge, jury and executioner, not those of a man who should be re-emphasising the need for a full and transparent investigation into the claims.

Kouchner’s crass remarks are those of a man who believes himself to be simultaneously judge, jury and executioner, not those of a man who should be re-emphasising the need for a full and transparent investigation into the claims.

By individualising responsibility and punishment for war crimes, the international tribunal was intended to facilitate conflict transformation by preventing the collectivisation of guilt. As is often the case in the Balkans, however, practice has fallen short of intention; justice has not remained blind, particularly to ethno-national identities, and many individual victims have become invisible. Only through the mutual recognition of each and every victim of the wars of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of their identity, can the foundations be laid to help transcend and transform hardening inter-ethnic divisions.

The persistent tension between recognition and relativisation – as highlighted by the Ganic case – demonstrates the challenges faced by those working to ensure that all crimes and victims are treated equally.

The Guardian